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ABSTRACT  
   
I study the performance of hedge fund managers, using quarterly stock holdings from 
1995 to 2010. I use the holdings-based measure built on Ferson and Mo (2012) to 
decompose a manager’s overall performance into stock selection and three components 
of timing ability: market return, volatility, and liquidity. At the aggregate level, I find that 
hedge fund managers have stock picking skills but no timing skills, and overall I do not 
find strong evidence to support their superiority. I show that the lack of abilities is driven 
by the large fluctuations of timing performance with market conditions. I find that 
conditioning information, equity capital constraints, and priority in stocks to liquidate can 
partly explain the weak evidence. At the individual fund level, bootstrap analysis results 
suggest that even top managers’ abilities cannot be separated from luck. Also, I find that 
hedge fund managers exhibit short-horizon persistence in selectivity skill.  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION  
Hedge fund managers are often perceived as savvy investment managers who can exploit 
their capacity for stock picking and market timing abilities without much limitation in 
their trading strategies. To profit from these opportunities, the smartest money managers 
have migrated to the hedge fund industry, thereby contributing to its dramatic growth in 
the last two decades.1 A large literature has developed contemporaneously to examine 
whether hedge fund managers truly exhibit superior ability. An important theme in this 
literature is the difficulty of using the available fund returns data to measure performance, 
due to several potential measurement biases, including self-selection, and distortions 
between reported and economic returns (e.g., Bollen and Pool (2009), Fung and Hsieh 
(2000, 2001), Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004), Jiang, Yao and Yu (2007), and Liang 
(2000, 2003)).  In response to these challenges, a more recent strand of literature studies 
hedge fund managers’ mandatory disclosures of quarterly portfolio holdings contained in 
Form 13F filings.2 This approach can potentially sidestep many of the pitfalls associated 
with returns-based performance measures and utilize an array of weight-based measures 
applied extensively in other settings, like mutual funds. 
I study hedge fund managers’ performance using a large sample of quarterly 
holdings from 1995 to 2010. In particular, I build on Ferson and Mo (2012), who use a 
stochastic discount factor (SDF) approach that decomposes a manager’s overall 
                                                 
1 According to Griffin and Xu (2009), hedge fund assets under management (AUM) have increased roughly 
from $38 billion in 1990 to $2.48 trillion in mid-2007.  
2 According to Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, hedge funds with over $100 million 
under management are required to fill out 13F forms on a quarterly basis for all U.S. equity positions worth 
over $200,000, or more than 100,000 shares.  
2 
performance into several components: security selection, market return timing, and 
market volatility timing. The three components can be expressed as a covariance between 
a manager’s portfolio weights and idiosyncratic stock returns (stock selection), market 
returns (return timing), and negative market volatility (volatility timing).  
I extend the Ferson and Mo (2012) decomposition to address a third component of 
timing – liquidity timing – that measures the covariance between a manager’s portfolio 
weights and market liquidity. To examine liquidity timing ability I construct a market-
wide traded liquidity risk factor based on Amihud (2002). This will be discussed more in 
detail later.  
At the aggregate level, I find that the average hedge fund manager delivers overall 
alpha of 2.08% (t-statistic 0.45), which represents selectivity alpha of 2.41% (2.54) per 
year and timing alpha of -0.32% (-0.07) per year.3 4  Although my point estimate can be 
economically meaningful as it covers the standard fixed management fees of 1 to 2%, the 
evidence is weak considering the conventional view of hedge fund managers’ superiority 
and the high incentive fees of 15 to 20%. Griffin and Xu (2009) also provide weak 
evidence on hedge fund managers’ abilities. They study hedge fund managers’ stock 
holdings using Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermer’s (DGTW, 1997) characteristic-
based performance measure, and conclude that hedge fund managers do not possess 
superior ability. However, I also explore other dimensions of abilities such as volatility 
                                                 
3
 For the definition of the “average fund,” see panel A of Table 4. 
4
 If I look at only “Long/Short Equity Hedge Strategy” (42% of the managers in my sample), the overall 
alpha is -27.22% per year (t-statistic -0.25), which represents selectivity alpha of 38.00% per year (2.52) 
and timing alpha of -65.22% (-0.61) per year. I determine a manager’s investment style as the investment 
style which is most frequently used by its funds under management. 
3 
and liquidity timing, and more importantly, I shed additional light on why we do not find 
strong evidence to support the conventional view of hedge fund managers’ superiority.  
One possible explanation for the weak evidence is that the average hedge fund 
performance largely fluctuates over time; hence the time-series mean offsets all extremes 
and remains insignificant. To investigate this, I perform a year-by-year and structural 
breakpoint analysis, which reveals that the overall performance varies with market 
conditions. I find that the main determinant of the volatile performance is timing ability, 
which appears to be strongly pro-cyclical. In particular, during 2008 the total (timing) 
performance is –55.17% p.a. (–59.06% p.a.), whereas during 2009 it is 23.83% p.a. 
(16.69% p.a.). This observation of hedge fund managers’ performance pro-cyclicality is 
in line with Patton (2008) who uses various different concepts of neutrality to present 
evidence against the market neutrality of hedge funds.5 In a similar context, Jurek and 
Stafford (2012) develop a simple state-contingent framework for evaluating the cost of 
capital for hedge fund managers’ non-linear risk exposures. They use the portfolio of 
writing index (S&P 500) put options and holding cash, and argue that the cost of capital 
estimated from the traditional linear factor model cannot cover the proper required rate of 
capital. Thus, the weak evidence of superior ability in this paper may suggest that a 
holdings-based measure can account for the hedge fund managers’ non-linear risk 
exposure and impose proper cost of capital which is higher than that imposed by a 
                                                 
5
 If I look at only “Equity Market Neutral” managers (8.1% of the managers in my sample), the 
performance is far from being market neutral. The total alpha is -50.59% (-1.77) per month and 23.01% 
(1.10) per month during 2008 and 2008, respectively.  
4 
returns-based model.6 That is, a stock-level linear factor model may be able to overcome 
the underestimation issue of cost of capital inherent in a portfolio-level linear factor 
model. In fact, with a holdings-based measure we can measure a fund’s beta directly, and 
allow a fund’ beta to change over time (on a monthly frequency in this paper), whereas 
with a returns-based measure we cannot measure a fund’s exposure directly, and usually 
assume a constant beta over the entire sample period.  
The change in the average fund’s performance with market conditions may not be 
detectable with an unconditional model. Under the conditional model in which I 
incorporate market conditions into the performance measure, the timing component (0.17% 
p.a.) becomes positive, whereas the selectivity alpha (2.39% p.a.) remains similar to its 
level without conditioning information. Moreover, about 20% of the overall performance 
during 2008 can be accounted for by conditioning information. Thus factoring economic 
state in the performance measure can help avoid committing the mistakes of undervaluing 
managers’ abilities.  
The fluctuations of the average fund’s performance with market conditions may 
also be explained by hedge funds’ capital structure. It is theoretically well established that 
arbitrageurs’ reliance on outside financing limits arbitrageurs’ trading activities. (e.g., 
Shleifer and Vishney (1997), Vayanos (2004), Gromb and Vayanos (2002, 2010), 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)) That is, during crises, in response to the first sign of 
deteriorating performance, hedge fund investors and lenders will react promptly by 
redeeming their shares and issuing margin calls. To meet the surging redemption requests 
                                                 
6
 For the evidence of hedge fund managers’ positive and statistically significant alpha based on a linear 
factor model and returns data, see e.g., Agarwal and Naik (2004), Fung and Hsieh (2004), and Hasanhodzic 
and Lo (2007). 
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and the heightened margin requirements, hedge funds may be forced to liquidate their 
positions at fire-sale prices. During market turmoil, the situation worsens because many 
other investors are also forced to sell off their positions at the same time. This behavior is 
detrimental to hedge funds’ performance because it prevents fund managers from 
implementing discretionary trading due to the widened bid-ask spread and increased 
leverage ratio of funds. Thus, hedge funds that allow investors to withdraw their money 
on short notice or rely heavily on leverage may encounter more difficulty in exploiting 
their superior ability when the market is tight. I show that hedge funds with strong share 
restrictions outperform those with weak share restrictions by 6.23% (2.95) per year 
during 2008, and by 2.29% (2.90) per year over the sample period. The latter is consistent 
with Aragon (2007) who presents the evidence of liquidity premium embedded in the 
share restrictions in hedge fund industry. The debt capital constraints due to leverage do 
not seem to affect performance as much as share restrictions.  
Also, given that the main determinant of the bad performance during market 
downturns is market return timing component, it is possible that facing forced liquidation 
hedge funds may prefer to sell off low market beta stocks, or that low market beta stocks 
happen to be those stocks subject to be liquidated first, like liquid stocks. This priority 
may expose hedge funds more to the market when the market return is low, causing their 
performance to deteriorate. This idea is similar to arguments in the previous literature 
which posits that there is a pecking order in stocks to sell off in the face of forced 
liquidation. (e.g., Ben-David, Franzoni and Moussai (2011), Brown, Carlin and Lobo 
(2010), and Scholes (2000) argue that investors put a higher priority on liquid stocks in 
the face of forced liquidation.) However, I find that they reduced their market return 
6 
exposure during crisis both by selling high beta stocks and buying low beta stocks. Also, 
they spent more money in buying low market beta stocks than earned by selling high 
market beta stocks. But, the exposure was still positive, and the market excess return was 
way below its historical average, which yields negative market return timing ability. In 
addition, we observe that the market beta of the stocks purchased by the average fund 
was highest during the tech bubble. 
In contrast, I find that the average hedge fund manager increased its exposure to 
the market liquidity during crisis by selling less sensitive stocks and buying more 
sensitive stocks. That is, they increased their exposure to the market liquidity when they 
were supposed to decrease. This implies their lack of liquidity timing ability. Indeed, I do 
not detect any significant results with respect to liquidity timing ability.  
In addition, consistent with prior literature the average hedge fund appears to 
prefer to sell off liquid stocks during market downturns. So it seems that the average 
hedge fund manager liquidated liquid stocks with high sensitivity to market return and 
low sensitivity to market liquidity. In fact, the correlation coefficients among market beta, 
liquidity beta, and liquidity confirm these observations. Also, although I find that the 
correlation coefficient between liquidity and liquidity beta of the stocks held by hedge 
fund managers is overall negative over the sample period, it closes to zero during crisis. 
This may advocate Sadka and Lou (2011) who argue that stock-level liquidity and 
liquidity risk (beta) are different concepts by showing that liquid stocks underperformed 
illiquid stocks during the recent financial crisis and that the performance of stocks during 
the crisis can be better explained by historical liquidity beta than stock-level liquidity.  
7 
Another possible story for the pro-cyclical movement of the average fund 
performance is that 13F data does not provide complete picture of all holdings, so we 
cannot observe their other positions which can possibly deliver positive alpha. Using 
funds’ returns data which reflect the performance from complete holdings, and 36-month 
rolling window, I find that the average fund exhibits positive market return timing, but 
negative liquidity- and volatility timing abilities during the recent financial crisis, but 
overall they do not appear to possess any timing abilities. In addition, the use of 
derivatives does not seem to be related to the time-variation of performance. Thus it is 
possible that during crisis, hedge funds attempted to time the market return during crisis 
using short positions, but it does not look like other positions are material in the average 
manager’s performance.  
Although I do not find much evidence supportive of superior ability at the 
aggregate level, it is possible that there are some managers in the extreme of the cross-
section who exhibit significantly positive performance. However, to investigate top 
managers, we need to rank managers according to their alphas, and consider order 
statistics. So our statistical inference needs to rely on the joint distribution of over 600 
managers’ skill distributions. Moreover, hedge fund managers’ abilities are likely to be 
non-normal, correlated with each other, and heterogeneous, which makes it more difficult 
to impose an ex-ante parametric distribution from which fund returns are assumed to be 
drawn. In this situation I follow previous studies and employ a bootstrap procedure which 
does not rely on an ex-ante parametric distribution but on an ex-post empirical joint 
distribution. (e.g., Kosowski et al. (2006), Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007), Jiang, Yao, 
and Yu (2007)). I find that even top managers do not exhibit skill which can be 
8 
distinguishable from luck. This is in contrast with Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007), who 
study hedge fund performance using returns data and bootstrap and Bayesian approach, 
and conclude that top hedge fund performance cannot be explained by luck alone. This 
may suggest that the performance effect of market conditions outweighs that of 
randomness. 
Furthermore, hedge funds exhibit a short-horizon performance persistence in 
selectivity skill, but not long-horizon persistence. This result may be in accordance with 
Berk and Green’s (2004) model in which the combination of managers’ differential 
ability, decreasing returns to scale, and investors’ rational provision of capital to funds 
results in zero risk-adjusted, after-fee returns to the investors.7  Also, considering the 
volatile movement of performance the lack of persistence in performance is not that 
surprising. 
 The main contribution of this paper is that (i) I provide several possible 
explanations for the weak evidence on hedge fund managers’ superiority by exploring the 
time-variation and decomposition of hedge fund managers’ performance, share 
restrictions, forced liquidation, and conditioning information, (ii) I introduce a liquidity 
timing ability under a holdings-based measure for the first time, and (iii) I conduct 
bootstrap analysis using holdings data to study the cross-section of hedge fund managers’ 
various abilities for the first time.  
                                                 
7
 Fung et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence in support of the rational model, using fund-of-funds 
returns data. Also, Griffin and Xu (2009) find a lack of performance persistence with the DGTW measure 
using hedge fund equity holdings data during 1992-2004. In contrast, Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov 
(2010) find significant performance persistence among superior funds, but little evidence of persistence 
among inferior funds. 
9 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 looks at the 
relevant literature. Chapter 3 discusses performance measure and estimation method. 
Chapter 4 describes the sample. Chapter 5 documents the results, and Chapter 6 
concludes. 
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE 
The current article is related to three strands of literature: (i) a holdings-based 
performance measure, (ii) hedge fund managers’ ability, and (iii) performance 
decomposition. 
 This paper relies on a holdings-based performance measure to investigate hedge 
fund managers’ ability. A number of empirical studies have provided a good amount of 
evidence that hedge fund returns data suffer from several measurement biases. Fung and 
Hsieh (2000) discuss a selection-, an instant history- , and survivorship bias. A selection 
bias occurs because only funds with good performance want to be included in a database 
and funds with poor performance can refuse to participate in a vendor’s database. An 
instant history bias occurs when hedge funds come into database vendors with instant 
histories which usually exhibit good track records, and the database vendors backfill the 
hedge funds’ performance. Lastly, survivorship bias occurs if funds drop out of a 
database because of poor performance and database vendors only contain information for 
those hedge funds that are still operating. Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) argue that 
the high serial correlation in hedge fund returns is likely the outcome of liquidity 
exposure and smoothed returns. If funds hold illiquid securities which are not actively 
traded and the market prices of which are not readily available, then the reported returns 
of these funds appear to be smoother than the economic returns which fully reflect all the 
available market information about the securities, which in turn will impart a downward 
bias on the estimated return variance. Furthermore, Bollen and Pool (2009) find a 
significant discontinuity in the distribution of monthly hedge fund returns at return of 
11 
zero after controlling for database biases such as survivorship bias. By showing that this 
discontinuity disappears when using bi-monthly returns or three months’ returns before 
an audit, they argue that hedge fund managers temporarily distort monthly returns to 
avoid reporting losses. Moreover, Liang (2000, 2003) finds significant differences in 
reported returns of the same funds between different databases. 
 To overcome such biases of hedge funds’ reported returns, several recent 
empirical papers examine hedge fund performance using holdings data.8 Griffin and Xu 
(2009) study hedge fund managers’ performance using quarterly 13F holdings of hedge 
funds, and conclude that hedge funds exhibit no ability to time sectors or pick better stock 
styles and raise serious questions about the perceived superior skill of hedge fund 
                                                 
8
 The literature notes several weaknesses in employing holdings data instead of returns data: (i) First, we 
have to limit our investigation to long equity positions. According to Fung and Hsieh (2006), 43% of hedge 
funds in the TASS database (and 32% of AUM) were invested in long/short equity strategies as of 2004. 
Also, 81% of hedge funds (76% of AUM) in their investigation are categorized as equity-oriented funds, 
i.e., convertible arbitrage, emerging market, equity market neutral, event driven, global macro, and 
long/short equity. Further, Aragon and Martin (2011) manually collect 13F filings and document that 
filings in options are a small proportion of hedge fund equity positions, although this observation is based 
only on the set of 13F-reportable securities and exchange-traded derivatives, which is small compared to 
OTC derivatives. (ii) Also, we can observe holdings on a quarterly basis. But the average quarterly turnover 
rate for the sample in this study is 21.9%. As the definition of turnover, I use the minimum of total buys 
and total sales, divided by the mean of current and lagged total equity holdings. (Brunnermeier and Nagel 
(2004) and Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2011) report the average quarterly turnover in their hedge 
fund sample as 25% and 39.4%, respectively.) This turnover rate legitimizes the use of a quarterly snapshot 
of holdings data to capture the low-frequency component of hedge fund trading. By splitting the sample 
into terciles according to the average quarterly turnover, and forming an equally weighted portfolio of 
going long the top turnover funds (average quarterly turnover of 37.0%) and short the bottom funds (7.0%), 
I find that the turnover matters only during the tech bubble (see Figure 7). However, I acknowledge that if 
hedge fund managers employ the strategies of buying and selling the same stocks within a quarter, we 
cannot capture such an activity. (iii) Furthermore, we can observe only large managers, which are subject to 
13F filings requirements. We cannot observe the long equity positions of those hedge funds that are not 
subject to 13F filings. To address this issue, I examine the size effect within 13F hedge fund managers by 
splitting the sample into terciles and quintiles according to the AUM (I aggregate the time-series average 
AUM across funds under a management firm). I find no significant difference in performance between the 
top and bottom portfolios. (iv) Finally, the holdings information is at the management firm level, not at the 
fund level as in mutual funds. To address this issue, I split the manager sample into terciles depending on 
the number of funds under a manager. I find no significant difference in overall performance between the 
top portfolio (the average number of funds under a manager is 14.3) and the bottom (the average number of 
funds under a manager is 1.0, i.e., the manager level is the same as the fund level). However, the timing 
alpha of the top portfolio is 0.48% p.a. (t-statistic: 1.88) lower than that of the bottom. 
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managers. To measure performance they rely on characteristics-matched benchmarks 
(DGTW), which control for size, value, and momentum effects. Brunnermeir and Nagel 
(2004) focus on hedge funds’ positions in tech stocks (high price-to-sale stocks) during 
the technology bubble from 1998 to 2000, and find that hedge funds were able to adjust 
their positions in tech stocks to capture the upturn and avoid the downturn. Using a 
unique dataset Aragon and Martin (2012) show that hedge fund managers’ long equity 
option positions can predict the directional and non-directional movement of the 
underlying stocks. Agarwal et al. (2012), and Aragon, Hertzel and Shi (2012) investigate 
confidential positions in 13F filings and find evidence of hedge fund managers’ capacity 
for informed trading.   
 Although portfolio managers’ performance can be evaluated in various respects, 
the existing literature mostly focuses on a specific aspect of ability. Namely, they look at 
only one of the following: market return timing, market volatility timing, and stock-
picking skill. The literature on timing measure stems from Treynor and Mazuy (1966) 
who look at the characteristic line of fund rate of return against the market return. If a 
manager can outguess the market, the manager will increase the portfolio sensitivity to 
the market (slope of the line) in anticipation of market rise and decrease in anticipation of 
market fall, so the characteristic line would exhibit a convex upward line. But they find 
that all but one of the mutual funds they investigated (57 funds) exhibit no curvature, so 
they conclude that managers cannot anticipate the major turns in the stock market. 
Henriksson and Merton (1981) investigate mutual fund managers’ market timing ability 
based on the covariance between market beta and the indicator variable for the sign of 
excess market return, to measure managers’ ability to forecast positive market excess 
13 
return. This permits them to identify the separate contributions from stock picking and 
market timing skills, which are mixed in the Jensen’s alpha from the linear regression. 
Busse (1999) studies mutual fund managers’ ability to time market volatility considering 
that market volatility is persistent and so predictable and that performance measures are 
risk-adjusted. Using mutual funds’ daily returns data he shows that funds that reduce 
systematic risk when market volatility is high earn higher risk-adjusted returns. Jiang, 
Yao, and Yu (2007) investigate mutual fund managers’ market return timing ability using 
holdings data. They directly measure funds’ market beta as the weighted average of the 
betas of the individual stocks held in the portfolio, and timing ability as the covariance 
between fund betas at the beginning of a holdings period and the holding period market 
returns. They find that mutual managers can time the market, which opposes to the 
previous evidence of insignificant or negative market timing ability of mutual funds 
based on returns data. 
A couple of papers deal with various abilities using holdings data. Daniel, 
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (DGTW, 1997) study mutual fund managers’ holdings 
data and develop a characteristic-based performance measure. They construct 
benchmarks by matching stocks held by a manger to the 125 passive portfolios of similar 
characteristics such as market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, and prior performance. 
They find evidence supportive of characteristic selectivity but no evidence of 
characteristic timing. Ferson and Mo (2012) develop a holdings-based performance 
measures which accommodate market level timing, volatility timing, and stock selectivity 
skills based on a stochastic discount factor approach. They find no significant evidence of 
investment ability in mutual fund industry. 
14 
Also, some studies use returns data to investigate various abilities. Cao et al. 
(2012) use hedge fund returns and Treynor and Mazuy (1966) approach of CAPM 
regression to explore market liquidity timing ability at the individual fund level. They 
find that top managers can adjust their portfolios’ market exposure to time market 
liquidity. But I do not find any evidence of liquidity timing ability in this paper. The main 
difference in results may be due to the fact that they assume a one-factor asset pricing 
model (CAPM), and measure liquidity timing ability as the covariance between market 
beta and liquidity risk (Pastor and Stambaugh’s liquidity level factor), while I assume a 
two-factor model consisting of market return and market liquidity, and measure liquidity 
timing ability as the covariance between liquidity beta and liquidity risk.9 Chen and Liang 
(2007) investigate hedge fund returns data to study the market timing ability of self-
described market timing managers. They propose a market timing measure which jointly 
evaluates market return level- and volatility timing ability by regressing fund returns on 
the squared Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio. They find evidence of timing ability at 
both the aggregate and the fund level.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 If I use Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) traded liquidity risk factor, liquidity innovation, or liquidity level, I 
still do not have any significant results.  
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Chapter 3 
PERFORMANC MEASURE AND ESTIMATION 
In this section, I briefly discuss the performance measure used in this paper.10 I assume a 
two-factor model consisting of market excess return and traded liquidity risk.11 That is, 
the benchmark portfolio is  
′   , 
where  and  represent market excess return and liquidity risk, respectively.  
The asset pricing model basically says that the asset price is equal to the expected 
value of discounted asset payoff,  

|Ω  , 
or in net return term, 
                                                             
|Ω  0,  
where   is a (inter-temporal) marginal rate of substitution, also called the stochastic 
discount factor (SDF) at time , and , , , and Ω  are, respectively, asset price, an 
asset payoff, return in excess of risk-free rate at time , and an information set available 
up to time t. In our setting the primitive assets are market excess return, liquidity risk 
portfolio return, and risk-free rate, so the pricing formula prices these assets.  
                                                 
10
 For details, see Cochrane (1996, 2005), Ferson and Lin (2012), Ferson and Mo (2012), and Ferson and 
Schadt (1996). 
11
 If I use Carhart four factors along with traded Amihud liquidity risk or traded Pastor and Stambaugh (PS) 
liquidity risk factor, the magnitude of alpha is reduced but the overall pattern is similar. The results are 
available upon request. For simplicity, I develop the intuition based on a two-factor model.  
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Assuming a linear factor model is equivalent to representing SDF as a linear 
function of factors (Ross (1978), Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982), Cochrane (1996)). 
Therefore, assuming a two-factor pricing model, we have  
                                             ,                                                                       (1) 
where  is our benchmark portfolio consisting of market return and liquidity risk 
portfolio return, and  and  are market-wide parameters.  
Section 1 
Unconditional Model 
If a manager possesses superior information not included in the public-information set 
Ω, and can take advantage of it to realize superior portfolio returns, the model does not 
price the fund return. Then we can define an unconditional SDF-based abnormal 
performance measure as 
                                                                
   0,                                                             (2) 
where  is the SDF and  is the return of the fund in excess of a short-term Treasury bill. 
By restricting to an unconditional measure - that is, only a constant term is in the 
information set - I assume any information can be proprietary.  
Now consider a factor model regression for the excess returns of N underlying 
securities in a portfolio: 
                                                ′  ,     ,                                                 3 
where  is the  ! 2 matrix of betas,  the vector of abnormal or idiosyncratic returns, 
and 
  0  
. 
If a fund forms a portfolio using weights , then the portfolio return is given by 
17 
                                                            ′   ′   ′.                                                    4 
Note that % & ' is the weighted average of betas of individual stocks held by a fund, 
which represents the fund’s beta to benchmark portfolio. Substituting equation (1) into 
the definition of alpha (2) we obtain 
     
% ′  ′
(′ %)  
 *  ′  ′+   (, %   ′)  
         *-.%,   -.%, +  ′
/0′   
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*  ′+  0 
         -.%,    -.% ,   ′
/0′   
(′ )1%2    
            5
 ′  ′
 ′6.                                                                                                 (5) 
The first term in (5) captures market return level timing through the covariance between 
the portfolio weights set at the beginning of a period and the subsequent factor market 
returns. Similarly, the second term captures liquidity timing ability. The third term relates 
to volatility timing through the covariation between portfolio weights and the second 
moment matrix of benchmark returns, which is what Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 1993) 
missed.12  The last term captures selectivity skill, which is the expected value of the 
interaction between portfolio weights and idiosyncratic abnormal returns, and excludes 
the part contributable to factors, which does not appear in traditional selectivity measures. 
 The market-wide parameters   and      are estimated based on the 
assumption that the benchmark portfolio and risk-free asset satisfy the pricing model, as 
shown in equations (6a) and (6b) below. For each fund, I estimate a market return timing 
                                                 
12
 They look at the covariance between portfolio weights and the returns of securities held in a portfolio, 
but view it in a little different way from the prior literature. They estimate a covariance as the expected 
value of security return multiplied by the deviation of portfolio weight from expected weight, and they 
proxy the expected weight as lagged weight. By doing so, they can address survivorship bias and the 
critique of the impact of a benchmark portfolio on performance measure.  
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component denoted as  , market liquidity risk timing ability  , a volatility timing 
component 7 , and a selectivity component 8 . The model is estimated using the 
generalized method of moments (GMM, Hansen, 1982) through the following moment 
conditions:  
9                                                                      6a 
9<    =>  1                                                         6b 
9A    µ                                                                            6c 
9C    (  µ)

%                                               6d1 
9C<    (  µ)

%                                                  6d2 
9E  7   %  µ
 %                                           6F 
9G  8  5  6                                                  6H 

9  
9,  9<,  9A, 9C, 9C<, 9E, 9G  0.                 (6g)       
 Stock betas for each risk factor and month are estimated using 60 monthly data 
prior to the current month, requiring at least 24 months of observations. For estimation I 
require each fund to have at least 15 observations, except for the yearly performance and 
persistence test, in which I require full 12 months of observations. I estimate the market-
wide parameters using the first three equations, (6a) to (6c) subject to (6g), and then 
plugging the parameter estimates into to the other equations (6d1) to (6f) subject to (6g) 
to solve for alphas. I solve the system of equations for each fund using GMM with the 
Newey-West (1987) covariance matrix using three lags to account for autocorrelations 
and heteroskedasticity-consistent estimate of the standard error.  
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Section 2 
Conditional Model 
We can incorporate the effects of conditioning information into the model by either (i) 
scaling the returns (Hansen and Singleton (1982)), or (ii) scaling the factors (Ferson, 
Kandel, and Stambaugh (1987), Harvey (1989), and Shanken (1990)). In this paper, I use 
the latter.13 In this case, the SDF can be represented by a linear combination of factors 
with weights as linear functions of instruments that change across different information 
sets; the conditional mean of factors can be expressed as a linear function of instruments. 
That is,  
                                              ′I  ′ I ,′ I ,; 
                                                  µ,  µ
′ I,  µ,  µ
′ I,   
where , and , are market excess return and liquidity risk factor at time ;  µ,  and 
µ, are conditional expectations of market excess return and liquidity risk factor at time 
; ,  , , µ, and µ are J ! 1 vectors of coefficients; and  I K Ω is a J ! 1 vector 
of instruments including a constant. 
Now the moment condition (6g) changes so that it holds when we multiply both 
sides of the equation by any instrument. For example, if we have two instruments, we 
will have nine equations for parameter estimation and twelve equations for performance 
estimation. 
Following the previous studies (Christopherson, Ferson, and Glassman (1998), 
Cochrane (1996), Ferson and Mo (2012), and Ferson and Shadt (1996)), I use a collection 
                                                 
13
 For details, see Cochrane (1996). 
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of public information variables that are shown to be useful for predicting security returns 
and risks over time: (i) the lagged three-month Treasury bill yield, (ii) the lagged 
dividend price ratio (iii) the lagged term spread, (iv) the lagged default return spread, and 
(v) a dummy variable for the month of January.  
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Chapter 4 
DATA 
The information on hedge fund returns, affiliations, and characteristics are from the 
TASS snapshot as of April 25, 2012. Because TASS has started to collect hedge fund 
data since 1994, it does not include defunct funds’ performance information before 1994. 
Thus I choose the sample over the period January 1994 to December 2010 to control for 
the survivorship bias.  
I obtain the 13F filers’ names, their equity holdings and the holding stocks’ prices 
data from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional (13F) Holdings database. 
To identify 13F filers that manage hedge funds, I first create a list of non-
duplicate hedge fund managers’ names over the sample period, where hedge fund 
managers are defined as either a “management company” or an “investment company” in 
a company type field in the TASS database. Also, I make a list of non-duplicate 13F 
filers’ names over the sample period. Then I manually match the hedge fund managers’ 
names to the 13F filers’ names. 
To address the backfilling bias, I choose the observations after the date they were 
added to the TASS database. In the event that a hedge fund manager is matched to 
multiple hedge funds and hence to multiple dates added to TASS, I choose the earliest 
date added to TASS for the manager. 
In terms of the predetermined information variables, (i) Treasury-bill rates are the 
3-month Treasury bill, (ii) dividend price ratio is the ratio of 12-month moving sums of 
dividends paid on the S&P 500 index to the prices, (iii) the term spread is the difference 
between the long-term yield on government bonds and the Treasury bill, and (iv) the 
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default yield spread is the difference between BAA and AAA-rated corporate bond 
yields.14  
I retrieve individual stocks’ information and Carhart four factors from the 
CRSP.15 I expand the quarterly holdings data to the three months in the next month to 
compile monthly data. 
In this paper I focus on a traded liquidity risk factor constructed from Amihud 
(2002) rather than Pastor and Stambaugh’s (2003) traded liquidity risk factor. Goyenko, 
Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) investigate whether liquidity measures constructed from 
daily data can measure liquidity as well as those from intraday data. They find that 
Amihud (2002) measure is a good proxy for price impact, while Pastor and Stambaugh’s 
(2003) gamma does not perform well compared to other measures. When we look at the 
cumulative traded liquidity risk factor over time (Figure 1), we can see little time-
variations in the Pastor and Stambaugh’s measure even during the crises like LTCM 
collapse, and tech bubble burst. 16 In contrast, we can observe a lot more variations in that 
of Amihud’s liquidity measure. Thus, it seems that new measure based on Amihud (2002) 
is more appropriate to study whether or not hedge fund managers time market liquidity. 
To construct a market-wide traded liquidity risk factor, I follow Amihud (2002) 
and Acharya and Pedersen (2005).17 First I compute individual stocks’ daily liquidity 
                                                 
14
 I thank Prof. Goyal for providing the data on his website: http://www.hec.unil.ch/agoyal/ 
15
 I thank Prof. Fama and Prof. French for sharing the data. 
16
 Note that I discuss only “traded” factor to compute alpha. In terms of cumulative factor, their other 
factors (liquidity level and liquidity innovation) seem to exhibit enough time-variation compared to their 
traded factor. I thank Prof. Pastor and Prof. Stambaugh for sharing the data. 
17
 I clean the daily stock return data in the following manner: (i) I use ordinary common shares (share code 
is less than 20), (ii) stocks listed on NYSE/AMEX (exchange code: 1, 2) (See Reinganum (1990) on the 
effects of the differences in microstructure between the NASDAQ and the NYSE on stock returns, after 
adjusting for size and risk. In addition, volume figures on the NASDAQ have a different meaning than 
those on the NYSE, because trading on the NASDAQ is done almost entirely through market makers, 
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measure as the negative signed ratio of absolute value of stock return to dollar volume. 
Then I compute the individual stocks’ monthly liquidity measure as the average of daily 
liquidity measures. The market-wide monthly liquidity level measure is computed as the 
value-weighted average of individual stocks’ monthly measures, where weight is 
determined by the prior month-end market capitalization. Then I obtain the monthly 
market-wide liquidity risk (innovation) as the residual of AR(2) process of the liquidity 
level using prior 60 months’ observations. For each month, I sort stocks into deciles 
according to their liquidity betas which are computed using prior 60 months’ 
observations requiring at least 24 months’ observations and using a regression model of 
stock return on market return and market liquidity risk. Finally, I compute the traded 
market liquidity factor as the return to the spread portfolio by buying the most sensitive 
portfolio and selling the least sensitivity one. Here, portfolio return is computed as the 
value-weighted average of returns of the stocks in the portfolio where weight is 
determined by the prior month-end market capitalization.    
The final sample contains (i) 13F filers managing hedge funds, (ii) their long 
equity holdings of the prior quarter-end, (iii) stock returns of the current month, (iv) stock 
betas for pricing factors, (v) pricing factors, and (vi) the previous month’s instruments for 
each month. 
                                                                                                                                                 
whereas on the NYSE most trading is done directly between buying and selling investors. This results in 
artificially higher volume figures on NASDAQ.), (iii) stocks whose number of price and volume 
observations within a month is at least 15, (iv) stocks whose prior month-end stock price is between $5 and 
$1,000 and prior month-end market capitalization exists. (v) stocks whose monthly liquidity measures lie 
between the 1st and below 99th percentiles. (vi) Also, volume is measured in $ million. Finally (vii) returns 
are adjusted for stock delisting to avoid survivorship bias. The last return used is either the last return 
available on CRSP, or the delisting return, if available. While a last return for the stock of -100% is 
naturally included in the study, a return of -30% is assigned if the deletion reason is coded in CRSP as 500 
(reason unavailable), 520 (went to OTC), 551-573 (various reasons), 574 (bankruptcy), and 584 (does not 
meet exchange financial guidelines). (Shumway obtains that -30% is the average delisting return, 
examining the OTC returns of delisted stocks.) 
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Chapter 5 
RESULTS 
In panel A of Table 1, I document the summary statistics for pricing factors. In panel B, I 
report the estimates for the market-wide parameters using equations (6a) to (6c) subject 
to (6g). In panel C, I document the expected value of SDF, which is actually the inverse 
of the expected risk-free rate when we assume that the risk-free asset is a primitive asset 
in the pricing model. 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the average fund’s monthly exposure to 
each risk, that is, the weighted average of the market beta, liquidity beta, and 
idiosyncratic risk of individual stocks held by the manager, where weight is determined 
by holdings.  
Panel A of Figure 2 depicts the average fund’s monthly risk exposure over time. 
Market exposure appears to be slowly increasing over time with slight dips during the 
NASDAQ crash and the recent global crisis. The liquidity risk exposure has been 
increasing slowly since mid-2005 to hit the high in recent financial crisis. Also, the 
average fund slightly increased its liquidity exposure during the tech bubble burst. That is, 
the average manager seems to have been increasing its exposure to the market liquidity 
when they had to increase the most. Based on these observations, we can conjecture that 
managers may have market timing ability but no liquidity timing ability.   
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of hedge fund industry in terms of size and 
holdings over the sample period. From panel A of Table 3 we can observe the increase in 
the number of hedge funds, and those subject to 13F, which reflects the growth of the 
industry over the past decade. Because the number of managers during 1994 ends up 
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being only two in the final sample, I do not include this year in the analysis afterwards. 
Panel B documents the size of the equity holdings of hedge fund managers compared 
with CRSP total equity holdings.18 To gauge the size of hedge funds subject to 13F, I 
examine the assets under management (AUM) in panel C, which shows that hedge funds 
subject to 13F are about two times bigger than their counterparts.  
Table 4 documents the performance estimates of the average hedge fund manager. 
Panel A of Table 4 presents a simple example showing how I construct a single 
representative portfolio in the current paper. To form an equally weighted portfolio, for 
each quarter I take the average of the positions of the individual managers, with one over 
the number of managers of the quarter as an equal weight; to form a value-weighted 
portfolio, I take the average of the positions of the individual managers, with total equity 
holdings of the quarter as weights. I use an equally weighted portfolio so that large funds 
do not dominate the overall results. Unless otherwise stated, “average fund,” “portfolio 
level,” and “aggregate fund level” refer to an equally weighted portfolio. Panel B of 
Table 4 reports the performance estimates from equations (6d) to (6f), subject to (6a) to 
(6c) and (6g) for the average fund under unconditional model. The results show that the 
average fund exhibits total alpha of 2.08% per year (t-statistic 0.45), which represents 
                                                 
18
 As of 2010, the ratio of total equity holdings by hedge fund managers to CRSP total equity holdings 
(24.87%) seems to be larger than the findings of Griffin and Xu (2009) and Ben-David, Franzoni, and 
Moussai (2012), who document the figure as around 3% to 5%. This difference may be because they use a 
different sample period, proprietary data, or stricter filters than I do. For example, they use only those 
managers whose main line of operations is hedge fund business, they exclude large investment banks and 
prime brokers that might have internal hedge fund business, management companies for which the ratio of 
13F AUM to TASS AUM exceeds 10%, and hedge funds with less than $1 million in total AUM, and they 
keep institutions of which more than half of their clients are classified as “High Net Worth Individuals” or 
“Pooled Investment Vehicles.” In fact, the number of hedge fund management firms in Griffin and Xu 
(2009) and Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussai (2012) are around 300 and 100, respectively. However, the 
medians are similar. 
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2.41% (2.54) of selectivity skill and –0.32% (–0.07) of timing ability.19 Although it is 
statistically insignificant, the point estimate is economically meaningful as it can cover 
the standard fixed management fees of 1 to 2%. Also, note that the overall performance 
comes primarily from stock picking ability. 
The weak evidence of the average fund’s capacity for informed trading is 
somewhat surprising considering the conventional view of hedge fund managers’ 
superiority and the high incentive fees investors are charged. One possible explanation 
for this weak evidence is that the average hedge fund performance is volatile over time, 
the time series mean of which fails to reflect such dynamics, thus producing insignificant 
estimates. To investigate the time-variation of performance, I look at a year-by-year 
performance. Yearly alpha is estimated using full 12 months’ observations for each year, 
and the GMM estimation method (6d1) to (6f) subject to (6g). I use the same market-
wide parameter estimates as before, that is, those reported in Panel B of Table 1. Indeed, 
we can observe that the yearly alpha of the average fund fluctuates over time, as 
presented in Figure 3.20 Also, although 75% of the years deliver positive total alpha, 
negative alpha years are primarily identified as having historically large plunges in the 
magnitude of alpha. Moreover, the latter is usually matched to significant market events, 
such as the NASDAQ crash and recent financial turmoil, that is, –15.70% per year, –
29.14% per year, and –55.17% per year correspond respectively to the 2001, 2002, and 
                                                 
19
 If I use the value-weighted portfolio, the magnitude of alpha is reduced but the overall pattern remains 
similar. The table is available upon request. 
20
 Remember that the estimation method here is not like that for the usual regression of fund returns on 
multiple factors, in which we need to ensure the number of estimates does not exceed the number of 
observations. Rather, the alphas here are computed independently of one another; thus we do not need to 
worry about the degree of freedom to the extent that we do not care about the significance level. 
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2008. Therefore, the yearly performance is determined mainly by the timing component, 
which is in turn largely affected by market conditions.  
To examine how performance changes with market conditions, I split the sample 
period into six sub-periods according to widely accepted structural break points: the 
period up to the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management L.P. (LTCM) and just 
before the tech bubble (January 1995 to September 1998), during the tech bubble 
(October 1998 to March 2000), the NASDAQ crash, the accounting scandal and 
September 11 attacks (April 2000 to October 2002), the subsequent period leading up to 
the mortgage crisis (November 2002 to June 2007), the recent financial crisis (July 2007 
to December 2008), and the remaining period (January 2009 to December 2010). Within 
these periods, more patterns of the average manager’s performance become manifest, as 
reported in Table 5. That is, market downturns are matched to significantly large negative 
alphas (the NASDAQ crash and the recent financial crisis, respectively, correspond to –
20.02% p.a. (t-statistic –2.00) and –39.92% p.a. (–1.72)), while market upturns or normal 
times are mostly matched to significant and positive alphas (the periods before the tech 
bubble, during the tech bubble, after the bubble crash leading up to the mortgage crisis, 
and after the recent crisis correspond to 4.86% p.a. (0.71), 23.38% p.a. (2.77), 12.81% p.a. 
(2.92), and 15.90 % p.a. (1.26), respectively).21, 22  
                                                 
21
 Fung et al. (2008) apply two structural breakpoints, LTCM crisis (September 1998) and the NASDAQ 
crash (March 2000), to their sample between 1995 and 2004. Hesse, Frank, and Gonzalez-Hermosillo 
(2008) identify subprime turbulence (July 2007) as the structural breakpoint. Ivashina and Sharfstein 
(2010) define August 2007 to July 2008 and August 2008 to December 2008 as crisis I and crisis II, 
respectively. To ensure enough observations in each sub-period, I combine the two into one (choosing 
either July 2007 or August 2007 does not make difference in the results). Also, the NASDAQ crash seems 
to continue until 2002 because of a series of accounting scandals and the September 11 attacks; therefore, I 
choose December 2002 as the end of the crash. 
 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stock_market_downturn_of_2002) 
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The pro-cyclical movement of the average fund’s performance may be able to be 
explained further by incorporating market conditions into the model. Under the 
conditional model, I allow the market-wide parameters to change over time, while under 
the unconditional model, I assume the parameters to be constant across the entire sample 
period. More specifically, each market-wide parameter is set to be a function of 
instruments, so that it changes with market conditions. Panel C of Table 4 presents the 
estimates with conditioning information, in which the timing component (0.17% p.a. (t-
statistic 0.04)) becomes positive, whereas the selectivity alpha (2.39% p.a. (2.37)) 
remains similar to its level without conditioning information. Moreover, Figure 3 shows 
that about 20% of the overall performance during 2008 can be explained by conditioning 
information. This suggests that without information about economic state, investors 
would commit the mistakes of using inflated risk exposure to ascribe poor performance to 
the manager. Furthermore, conditioning information does not appear to affect the 
selectivity measure. 
The change in the average fund’s performance with market conditions may also 
be explained by hedge funds’ capital structure. If hedge funds have devices to alleviate 
investors’ running on the funds during crises, they are less likely to be forced to engage 
in fire-sales. Then managers can maintain their discretionary trading activities with less 
capital constraints. To investigate the impact of capital constraints on fund mangers’ 
arbitrage activities, I split the sample into two or three sub-samples according to share 
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 We design the estimation method to account for the autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of the residual 
terms of the time series; that is, we use the Newey-West covariance matrix with a lag of three, which is 
why I split the sample this way. Ignoring the time-series characteristics and breaking the sample 
dichotomically into crisis (the NASDAQ crash and recent financial crisis) and non-crisis (the remaining 
period) periods, we still have consistent results. That is, –27.34% p.a. (t-statistic –2.51) for the crisis, which 
represents selectivity alpha of 4.81% (1.80) and timing alpha of -32.15% (3.19)), and 12.16% p.a. (3.34) for 
the non-crisis, which consists of selectivity alpha of 1.58% (1.74) and timing alpha of 10.58% (2.97). 
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restrictions such as lock-up periods and redemption-notice periods (equity capital 
constraints), and average leverage (debt capital constraints) using a TASS snapshot as of 
April 25, 2012. Then I form a portfolio of going long the top portfolio and short the 
bottom, the yearly alpha of which is depicted in panels A and B of Figure 4. We can see 
that those with longer redemption notice periods tend to outperform those with shorter 
redemption notice periods by 6.23% (2.95) during 2008. Also, those with lockup period 
clause appear to outperform those without lockup period clause by 2.83% (2.52) during 
2008. Overall those with strong share restrictions seem to perform better than those with 
weak share restrictions as shown in Panels A and B of Table 6, an outcome that appears 
to be mainly driven by mangers’ stock picking skill. Also, we can see that share 
restrictions played an important role during tech bubble period. But we can also observe 
the slight drop in performance of the funds with strong share restrictions during 2007. 
This may suggest that there could have been pre-emptive reaction by investors because of 
the concave flow-performance relationship in the presence of share restrictions as argued 
by Ding et al. (2008). Those with leverage tend to perform a little better than those 
without during the recent financial crisis, as illustrated in panel C of Figure 4. During 
2008 it seems that leverage was helpful for improving timing performance.23  
Another way to think of the large fluctuations in average fund performance with 
market conditions is to approach them from the forced liquidation story. That is, hedge 
funds in the face of forced liquidation may prefer to sell off the stocks with low 
sensitivity to the market return, leaving them with high sensitivity stocks when market 
                                                 
23
 But Ang, Gorovvy, and Inwegen (2011) show that hedge funds keep changing their leverage, which is 
countercyclical to the leverage of listed financial intermediaries. So the weak evidence may be due to the 
coarse indicator variable for average leverage. 
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return plunges. Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussai (2011), Brown, Carlin, and Lobo 
(2010), and Scholes (2000) posit that investors prioritize their stocks when facing forced 
liquidation or during risk management, such as selling off liquid stocks. However, as 
Panel A of Figure 2 shows, the average hedge fund manager actually reduced its market 
exposure through their equity holdings during the market downturns, both by selling high 
beta stocks and buying low beta stocks. But the total exposure was still positive when 
market return is far below its historical average, so we have negative timing ability. In 
addition, we can observe that the beta of the stocks purchased by the average fund was 
highest during the tech bubble.  
In contrast, the average hedge fund increased its exposure to the market liquidity 
during the recent financial crisis, by selling less sensitive stocks and buying more 
sensitive stocks as shown in Panels B and C of Figure 2. Indeed they exhibit negative 
liquidity timing ability during crisis although the magnitude is small compared to that of 
market return timing ability.   
In addition, I look at the difference in stock-level liquidity between the stocks 
bought and sold by the average manager, which is shown in Panel D of Figure 2. To 
avoid the price impact of trade, I use 12 month prior liquidity level measure. We can see 
that during 2008Q3, the difference in value-weighted average liquidity between the 
stocks sold and bought is significantly negative, while the difference in equally weighted 
average is insignificant. This suggests that those stocks sold a lot are more liquid than 
those stocks bought a lot. Similar phenomena are observed during 1998Q3 and 2000Q1. 
Thus, consistent with the previous literature, it seems that liquid stocks are more 
preferred to be sold off during market downturns.  
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Overall, it seems that during the second half of 2008, the stocks sold off by the 
average hedge fund manager can be described as liquid stocks with high sensitivity to 
market return and low sensitivity to market liquidity compared to the stocks she 
purchased. In fact, as depicted in Panel E, we can observe that the correlation between 
liquidity and liquidity beta is negative, and the correlation between liquidity and market 
beta is positive over the sample period. However, what we can also observe is that the 
correlation between liquidity and liquidity risk closes to zero during crises, which means 
that liquidity level and risk becomes more independent. This can be consistent with 
Sadka and Lou (2011), who argue that liquid stocks can be dangerous during crisis by 
showing that liquid stocks (stock level) can underperform illiquid stocks during crisis, 
and the performance of stocks during the crisis can be better explained by historical 
liquidity beta than stock level liquidity.  
 Another possible story for the pro-cyclical movement of the average fund 
performance is that 13F does not provide complete picture of all holdings, so we cannot 
observe their other positions which can possibly deliver positive alpha. Other positions 
can include short selling and derivatives. If such strategies are used, we would expect the 
overall market exposure of the average fund to be negative or small during the market 
pullbacks, and liquidity exposure to be positive or big during the market liquidity dry-ups. 
To investigate this, I form an equally weighted portfolio of the funds whose managers fall 
into the final sample in this study using hedge fund returns data from TASS, and then 
employ the returns-based performance measure following Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and 
Cao et al. (2012). That is, the market-, liquidity- , and volatility timing are measured as 
the coefficient estimates of β, γ, and θ, respectively, in the following regression: 
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FF,    OPQ=R<  SOPQ=R ! JTUV  WOPQ=R ! XTYV  RZ7 H\.], 
where FF, is the portfolio return in excess of risk-free rate at month , MKTRFc is the 
market excess return in month  , JTUV  the demeaned traded Amihud liquidity factor, 
XTYV the demeaned VIX (measure of implied volatility of S&P 500 index options), and  
RZ7 H\.] the Fung and Hsieh seven factors, which include three trend following 
factors (bond  (PTFSBD), currency (PTFSFX), and commodity (PTFSCOM)), two 
equity-oriented risk factors (equity market (MKTRF), size spread factor (SMB)), and two 
bond-oriented risk factors (bond market (YLDCHG), credit spread factor 
(BAAMTSY)).24 Using 36-month rolling window, I find that the average fund exhibits 
positive market return timing and negative liquidity- and volatility timing ability during 
the recent financial crisis, but overall I do not find evidence of timing abilities as shown 
in Panel A of Figure 5 and Panel A of Table 7.  
To examine whether the use of derivatives makes any difference in performance 
dynamics, I break down the sample according to the hedge fund managers’ use of 
derivatives, which is proxied by the average of the TASS “Derivatives” indicator across 
individual funds for each manager. The difference in alpha between hedge fund managers 
who do and do not use derivatives seems to be a little counter-cyclical, as illustrated in 
Panel C of Figure 5, which suggests the possibility that derivatives users use long equity 
positions for hedging purposes.25 
                                                 
24
 I thank Prof. Hsieh for providing the data on his website:  
 http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/HFData.htm 
25
 But Aragon and Martin (2012) show that there is a big gap in derivative indicator between their hand-
collected 13F holdings information and the snapshot from TASS. So the weak evidence can be driven by 
this information gap.  
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In summary, conditioning information, equity capital constraints, and priority of 
the stocks sold in the face of forced liquidation can partly explain the time-variation of 
the average fund performance with market conditions. However, debt capital constraints, 
and use of derivatives do not seem to account for the performance dynamics.  
Another plausible explanation for the average hedge fund manager’s lack of skill 
is that, as Griffin and Xu (2009) mentioned, hedge funds employ strategies that only 
work under certain market conditions, such as during the tech bubble. Brunnermeier and 
Nagel (2004) examine hedge funds’ 13F holdings from April 1998 to December 2000, 
and show that hedge funds adjust their positions in high price-to-sales stocks in a timely 
fashion to capture the upturn and avoid the downturn during the technology bubble. 
However, I find evidence consistent with Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) only in terms 
of selectivity skill.26  
Relative to overall timing and performance, the selectivity alpha of the average 
fund tends to be stable over time. It does not plummet during market downturns, and is 
even positive during those periods.  
Although the average fund performance is weak, skill can still exist at the 
individual fund level. Figure 8 provides the distribution of individual funds’ alphas. The 
normal distribution does not appear to fit well with the alpha distribution of individual 
funds. Overall, the alpha distribution is more peaked (has higher kurtosis) than normal 
and so tends to have slightly heavy tails on both sides. Most alpha distributions appear to 
be skewed to the left except for selectivity alpha. 
                                                 
26
 Using the same sample period as theirs, I find that the SDF-based selectivity alpha is 5.42% p.a. (t-
statistic 1.54) for the equally weighted portfolio, while the timing alpha is only  0.32% (0.03).  
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To assess the significance of the cross-sectional statistics of ability, I rely on a 
bootstrap procedure following Kosowski et al. (2006) and Jiang, Yao, and Yu (2007). 
The reasons are as follows: first, we cannot just rely on t-statistics to determine the 
statistical significance at the individual fund level as we do analysis at the aggregate level. 
This is because to investigate ranked managers, we need to consider order statistics, 
which means that we need to figure out the joint distribution of over 600 managers’ skill 
probability distribution. Thus, if we examine funds’ ability based on the t-statistics, we 
can have some funds with significant positive ability just by sample variation, regardless 
of their actual ability. Second, we cannot assume the ability is identically and 
independently distributed (i.i.d.) across funds. Hedge funds can hold significantly 
different stocks or similar stocks according to their investment strategies, which means 
that their ability can be heterogeneous and correlated. Also, the life spans of funds do not 
necessarily overlap with one another, and the number of sample changes over time. 
Finally, the finite sample distributions for the cross-sectional statistics can be different 
from their asymptotic counterparts.  To address these issues, I follow the prior studies and 
rely on a bootstrap analysis that depends on the ex-post empirical distribution rather than 
the ex-ante parametric distributions. 
The bootstrapping procedure obtains the distribution of a particular cross-
sectional statistic (say, top 10th manager’s alpha) under the null hypothesis of no ability, 
and then compares it to the actual statistic to determine the statistical significance level 
for the statistic. To conduct the bootstrap analysis, I first generate a large number of 
cross-sections (here, 1,000 iterations) of individual funds’ alphas under the assumption of 
no ability. To do so, I fix the stocks’ market and liquidity betas, and portfolio weights, 
35 
but instead randomly sample with replacement the idiosyncratic stock returns, market 
returns, liquidity risk, and risk-free rate, independently, to generate a hypothetical dataset. 
27
 
28
 Then I compute alphas for each manager to generate one hypothetical cross-section. 
This can be called the 1st iteration. We do the same procedures until we get the 1,000th 
iteration. By doing so, we can generate 1,000 cross-sections of alphas under the 
assumption of no ability. For example, suppose that I want to know whether or not the 
top 10th manager’s alpha is from luck.  Then I pick the top 10th alpha from each of the 
1,000 hypothetical cross-sectional distributions, and compare the 1,000 top 10th 
hypothetical alphas with the actual top 10th manager’s alpha. If the actual alpha is 
consistently higher than the corresponding hypothetical alpha, then we cannot say that the 
manager’s alpha is from luck. So the bootstrapped p-values for alpha and t-statistic, 
respectively, can be computed by   
      defgh,i 
∑ /iklmnopqorstu,   rviwsoxtu2r
,yyy
, or defgh, 
∑ /z{eklmnopqorstu,   rvz{ewsoxtu2r
,yyy
, 
where 1*+ is an indicator variable having value of 1 if the statement  is correct, and 0 
otherwise.29 That is, a low value of p (close to zero) implies that the actual alpha is 
consistently higher than its bootstrapped values and the evidence of ability, while a high 
                                                 
27
 I use different seed numbers for each factor.  
28
 Alternatively, one could randomly select holdings positions for each fund. However, it is challenging 
because managers hold different stocks over time and stocks exist only for some periods. Also, considering 
that hedge fund managers’ investment strategies are correlated with each other, keeping the actual holdings 
information fixed can preserves the covariance structure of the fund’s market exposure (strategy) with 
correlated fund betas. 
29
 t-statistic is a pivotal statistic, which has some superior statistical properties when constructing 
bootstrapped cross-sectional distributions, since it scales alpha by its standard error, which tends to be 
larger for short-lived funds for funds that take higher levels of risk. In addition, it is related to the Treynor 
and Black (1973) appraisal ratio, which is commonly used by practitioners to rate fund managers, and is 
prescribed by Brown et al. (1992) for helping to mitigate survival bias problems. Thus, the distribution of 
bootstrapped t-statistics in the tails is likely to exhibit better properties than the distribution of bootstrapped 
alpha estimates in the region. 
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value of p (close to one) implies that the estimated timing measure is consistently lower 
than its bootstrapped values and thus evidence of luck.  
 Table 8 reports the results of bootstrap analysis for alphas and t-statistics. We can 
see that even top managers’ skills are likely from luck (we have only three exceptions in 
the t-statistics case: managers of the top selectivity skill, the top and top 90th volatility 
skill). This is in contrast with Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007), who study hedge fund 
performance using returns data and bootstrap and Bayesian approach, and conclude that 
top hedge fund performance cannot be explained by luck. This may suggest that the 
performance effect of market conditions outweighs that of randomness.  
Table 9 reports the performance persistence of individual funds. Following 
Griffin and Xu (2009), I examine the performance persistence in two ways: based on the 
prior year’s performance and on the entire performance history. First, for each year, I sort 
managers into quintiles according to their previous year’s alphas, requiring a full 12 
months of observations.30 Then I form an equally weighted portfolio for each quintile, 
and estimate alphas of the current year for each quintile portfolio. To ensure that I have 
enough funds for ranking, the evaluation period starts in 1997. Panel A of Table 9 
presents alphas for each quintile in which the portfolio is rebalanced every year according 
to the previous year’s ranking, and is held for one year. Also reported is the performance 
difference between the top and the bottom portfolios to examine the performance 
persistence. We can observe weak performance persistence for total alpha (3.44% p.a. 
(1.48)), which can be decomposed into positive selectivity component (3.69% p.a. (2.20)) 
                                                 
30
 Conducting the same experiments with the previous 2 years’ observations requiring at least 15 
observations yields slightly weaker results than conducting the experiments with 1 year of observations, but 
selectivity skill still exhibit persistence. 
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and the negative timing component (–0.25% p.a. (-0.13)). When ranking is based on the 
prior year’s selectivity skill, the selectivity component again appears to be persistent 
(3.92% p.a. (2.11)), whereas the timing component (–0.58% p.a. (-0.42)) reduces the 
overall performance (3.34% p.a. (1.43)). Timing ability does not exhibit persistence. 
These results are in line with the unstable movement of timing alpha and the relatively 
stable movement of selectivity alpha, as shown in the portfolio level analysis. Next I 
investigate the performance persistence based on the entire history, taking into account 
the fact that investors generally base their decisions on the entire history rather than only 
the last year’s performance. The results shown in panel B of Table 9 are weaker than 
those based on the prior year’s performance. We can view this finding as supporting the 
rational model of Berk and Green (2004). In their model, managers have differential 
abilities to generate risk-adjusted returns but face decreasing returns to scale in deploying 
their ability; thus investors’ rational provision of capital to funds with superior skill 
results in zero risk-adjusted, after-fee returns to the investors. Ignoring the statistical 
significance, the spread portfolio based on the prior year’s market timing delivers the 
highest total alpha (3.89% p.a. (1.81)). In contrast, the portfolio formed according to the 
prior year’s volatility timing yields the worst timing ability in the following year (-4.24% 
p.a. (-1.47)). For the entire history case, the portfolio based on the historical total 
performance performs the best. 
This paper introduces liquidity timing ability using a holdings-based measure for 
the first time. However, I do not detect any significant liquidity timing ability both at the 
portfolio level and at the individual fund level. Cao et al. (2012) investigate liquidity 
timing at the individual fund level, relying on a returns-based measure and bootstrap 
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analysis, and argue that managers of equity-oriented hedge funds can time the market 
liquidity by adjusting the funds’ exposure based on their forecasts about market liquidity 
conditions.31 The results are consistent at the aggregate level in that we both do not find 
significant evidence on liquidity timing ability. But the difference at the individual fund 
level may be due to the fact that they assume liquidity as one dimension of market 
conditions and measure the liquidity timing ability as the covariance between market beta 
and liquidity risk, while I assume the two factors play independent roles in asset pricing, 
and measure it as the covariance between liquidity beta and liquidity risk.32 Another 
possibility is that managers have little information about future unexpected liquidity risk, 
or they time the market liquidity with high frequency.33  
I also investigate whether hedge fund managers can time market liquidity even if 
liquidity risk is predictable based on publicly available information. Pesaran and 
Timmermann (1995) examine whether the predictability of U.S. stock returns could have 
been exploited by investors, and find that the predictive power of various economic 
                                                 
31
 By replicating Cao et al. (2012) and observing that a larger proportion of hedge funds subject to 13F 
filings lie on the right-hand side of the timing ability distribution (their Table 4), I confirm that different 
datasets do not drive the different results. 
32
 However, using their returns-based measure, both the average fund constructed from their sample and the 
average fund from mine do not exhibit liquidity timing ability. When I change only the PS liquidity level to 
the PS traded liquidity risk factor (or PS non-traded liquidity risk factor) in their returns-based setting, the 
results become weaker.  
33
 Under the assumption that managers possess no special skill, the holdings-based measure can avoid the 
interim-trading bias raised in the returns-based measure, because we can use ex-ante information, which is 
not contaminated by subsequent trading activities using public information between returns-reporting dates. 
However, under the assumption that managers possess superior ability, the holdings-based measure has less 
statistical power than the returns-based measure, because of the lower frequency of the data (quarterly vs. 
monthly). Based on the existing literature, to resolve the loss of statistical power issue, I could use publicly 
available high-frequency (daily) data, such as market returns and stocks returns or conditioning information, 
employ simulation or bootstrap analysis to show the superiority of holdings-based measure over the 
returns-based measure (Ferson and Khang, 2002; Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ivkovich, 2000; Jiang, Yao, 
and Yu, 2007). Future research could conduct the experiment using daily liquidity-factor data. In addition, 
Busse (1999) and Bollen and Busse (2001) use proprietary high-frequency (daily) fund-return data. Ferson, 
Henry, and Kisgen (2006) exploit the specific feature of SDF such that SDF for term-structure models can 
be represented as simple exponential functions of term-structure factors.  
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factors over stock returns changes through time.  Based on the evidence from early 
studies they select a benchmark set of regressors from which an investor can select 
predictors of market returns in “real time.” The set consists of a constant as well as nine 
regressors including the dividend yield, earnings-price ratio, 1-month T-bill rate, 12-
month T-bond rate, year-on-year inflation, year-on-year rate of change in industrial 
output, and year-on-year growth rate in the narrow money stock.  
  To my knowledge, existing studies do not examine the predictability of market-
wide liquidity. Therefore I establish a base set of potential forecasting variables from 
Welch and Goyal’s (2007) study of the predictors of the equity premium. I choose the 
nine variables which are most highly correlated with the traded liquidity risk factor over 
the period of January 1984 to December 2011. Namely, lagged traded liquidity risk factor, 
lagged book-to-market ratio (the ratio of book value to market value for the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average), lagged Treasury-bill rate (3-Month Treasury), lagged long-term 
yield (long-term government bond yield), lagged inflation rate(Consumer Price Index), 
lagged stock variance (sum of squared daily returns on the S&P 500), lagged CRSP 
spread value-weighted index, lagged dividend price ratio (the difference between the log 
of dividends and the log of prices), and lagged earnings price (the difference between the 
log of earnings and the log of prices).  
For each month, I run OLS regressions of the traded market-wide liquidity factor 
on all the possible combinations of nine potential forecasting variables using the prior 60 
months of observations. Thus, for each month, I run 512 (=29) regressions and select the 
best forecasting equation for the month based on the statistical model selection criteria 
such as Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion 
40 
(BIC), and R-square (R2). Based on the estimated coefficients from the best forecasting 
equation, I make the one-month ahead prediction of liquidity factor. The AIC and BIC 
criteria are likelihood-based and assign different weights to the “parsimony” and “fit” of 
the models. The “fit” is measured by the maximized value of the log-likelihood function, 
and the “parsimony” by the number of freely estimated coefficients.  
 Following Pesaran and Timmermann (1995), I examine the fit of the recursive 
forecasts by looking at the recursively computed squared correlation coefficient between 
the recursive forecasts obtained under the different model selection criteria and the actual 
traded liquidity risk portfolio return, which are reported in Figure 9. Although the traded 
liquidity risk portfolio return seems to have been weakly predictable during the recent 
financial crisis based on publicly available information and rolling model selection 
criteria, overall it does not seem to be predictable. Also, if we just look at whether the 
sign of actual liquidity and forecast coincide, we have the same sign for slightly more 
than 50% of months (52%-55%) for all model selection criteria over the period (January 
1989 to December 2011) and the sample period (January 1995 to December 2010). The 
lack of predictability in the traded liquidity risk factor based on public information shed 
light on the lack of liquidity timing ability among hedge fund managers. In particular, the 
evidence here helps exclude the puzzling scenario in which managers do not exhibit 
timing ability even though liquidity returns are predictable.  
 Moreover as in the case of Pesaran and Timmermann (1995), the best predictors 
seem to change over time as shown in Panel D of Figure 9, thereby highlight the 
importance of a dynamic model for model selection. Overall it seems that CRSP S&P 
value-weighted index, stock variances, and book-to-market ratio are the best predictors 
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over the period of January 1989 through December 2011, while the lagged liquidity and 
dividend to price ratio are more important during the earlier period, and the Treasury bill 
rate and Long-term yield are more important during the later period.  
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I evaluate hedge fund managers’ stock picking skill and various timing 
abilities – market return, volatility, and liquidity – using 13F equity holdings data and a 
stochastic discount factor (SDF) model built on Ferson and Mo (2012). Consistent with 
Griffin and Xu (2009), I find weak evidence of hedge fund managers’ capacity for 
informed trading. 34  However, by examining the time-variation and decomposition of 
performance of the average hedge fund manager, I shed additional light on why we do 
not find strong evidence to support the conventional view of hedge fund managers’ 
superiority.  
At the aggregate level, I find that the weak evidence is driven by the large 
fluctuations in overall performance, which are determined primarily by the timing 
component, which in turn largely depends on market conditions. In contrast, selectivity 
skill exhibits relatively stable patterns over time, and does not seem to be as affected by 
market conditions. Moreover, I show that the conditioning information, equity capital 
constraints, and priority in stocks to liquidate can partly explain the time-variation of 
performance with market conditions. However, debt capital constraints, and use of 
derivatives do not seem to account for the performance dynamics.  
Also, at the individual fund level, using bootstrap analysis I show that even the 
top managers’ alphas cannot be separated from luck, which is in contrast with the 
                                                 
34
 Using one of Griffin and Xu’s (2009) sub-sample periods overlapping with mine, 1995-2004, I find that 
the GMM estimation for the equally weighted portfolio constructed from my sample gives total alpha of 
2.22% p.a. (t-statistic 0.44), selectivity alpha of 2.42% p.a. (1.67), and timing alpha of -0.19% p.a. (-0.04). 
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existing evidence based on hedge fund returns data. Also, I find that there is a short-term 
persistence in hedge fund managers’ performance.  
For future research it would be interesting to conduct the analysis with high 
frequency data, and more refined data.  
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FIGURES AND TABLES  
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Figure 1. Cumulative traded liquidity risk factor: Pastor and Stambaugh vs. Amihud. 
 
The top one depicts the cumulative traded monthly liquidity factor constructed from 
Amihud (2002), and the bottom one depicts that of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). I 
cumulate the logarithm of one plus traded liquidity risk portfolio return. Monthly traded 
Pastor and Stambaugh measure is downloaded from Prof. Stambaugh’s homepage. Their 
measure is computed as the return to the spread portfolio sorted on liquidity innovations 
in their paper. The traded Amihud liquidity measure is computed as the return to the 
spread portfolio based on liquidity sensitivity. That is, each month stocks are sorted into 
deciles based on their liquidity sensitivity, and then a spread portfolio is formed by 
buying the top decile portfolio (the most sensitive group) and selling the bottom decile 
portfolio (the least sensitive group). Liquidity sensitivity is computed as the coefficient 
estimate in the regression of stock return on market excess return and market-wide 
liquidity measure. For each month, I use prior 60 months’ observations requiring at least 
24 months’ observations to run regressions.  Monthly market return, risk-free rate, and 
stock information are from CRSP. Market-wide liquidity measure is computed as the 
residual of the regression of monthly Amihud liquidity measure on two lagged monthly 
Amihud liquidity measures. I use 60 months’ observations to run this regression. Monthly 
Amihud liquidity measure is computed as the monthly average of daily liquidity measure, 
where daily liquidity measure is defined as minus one multiplied by the daily ratio of 
stock return over dollar volume following Amihud (2002).  
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Table 1. Factors. 
 
Panel A. Summary statistics of the monthly market return in excess of the risk-free rate 
and the traded Amihud liquidity factor over the period 1995 January to 2010 December. 
The traded Amihud liquidity measure is computed as the return to the spread portfolio 
based on liquidity sensitivity. That is, each month stocks are sorted into deciles based on 
their liquidity sensitivity, and then a spread portfolio is formed by buying the top decile 
portfolio (the most sensitive group) and selling the bottom decile portfolio (the least 
sensitive group). Liquidity sensitivity is computed as the coefficient estimate in the 
regression of stock return on market excess return and market-wide liquidity measure. 
For each month, I use prior 60 months’ observations requiring at least 24 months’ 
observations to run regressions.  Monthly market return, risk-free rate, and stock 
information are from CRSP. Market-wide liquidity measure is computed as the residual 
of the regression of monthly Amihud liquidity measure on two lagged monthly Amihud 
liquidity measures. I use 60 months’ observations to run this regression. Monthly Amihud 
liquidity measure is computed as the monthly average of daily liquidity measure, where 
daily liquidity measure is defined as minus one multiplied by the daily ratio of stock 
return over dollar volume following Amihud (2002). Monthly market return, risk-free 
rate, and stock information are from CRSP. 
 
 n mean std min q1 Med q3 max 
Market 192 0.0056 0.0480 -0.1855 -0.0232 0.0150 0.0364 0.1104 
Liquidity 192 -0.0024 0.0583 -0.2360 -0.0314 0.0004 0.0228 0.3416 
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Panel B. Estimates of the market-wide parameters under unconditional model. I estimate 
the parameters for the equations (6a) to (6c) subject to (6g) using the GMM method with 
the Newey-West covariance matrix of three lags.1 Here, I assume the parameters are 
fixed over the sample period 1995 January and 2010 December, and I use the monthly 
risk-free rate, market excess return and traded Amihud liquidity measure as the primitive 
assets.  
 
Parameter Estimate StdErr t-value Probt DF 
 1.0171 0.0222 45.74 <.0001 191 
 2.9383 1.9348 1.52 0.1305 191 
 -1.3921 1.2689 -1.1 0.2740 191 
| 0.0056 0.0038 1.48 0.1418 191 
| -0.0024 0.0040 -0.59 0.5539 191 
 
Panel C. Mean of the SDF. Since we assume risk-free portfolio is a primitive asset, it 
satisfies the asset pricing formula, so we have the expected value of SDF as the inverse of 
the expected value of gross risk free rate. I use monthly risk-free rate over the sample 
period 1995 January to 2010 December, which are obtained from CRSP.  
 
  n 
 
 192 0.9973 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The table of 25 coefficient estimates for the parameters under conditional model is available upon request.  
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Table 2. Average fund’s exposure 
 
The summary statistics of the average fund’s monthly exposure to the market excess 
return, the traded Amihud liquidity measure, and the idiosyncratic risks. The exposure is 
the weighted average of betas or idiosyncratic risk of individual stocks held by the 
average fund, with prior quarter-end holdings as weights. I obtain individual stock betas 
using the regression of stock excess return on market excess return and traded Amihud 
liquidity risk factor, and the previous 60 months of observations requiring at least 24 
months of observations. 
 
 N mean std min q1 med q3 max 
Market ' 192 0.8376 0.0963 0.6711 0.7614 0.8328 0.9046 1.0273 
Liquidity ' 192 0.0829 0.0651 -0.0260 0.0146 0.0903 0.1347 0.2347 
Idiosyncratic risk ' 192 0.0021 0.0094 -0.0304 -0.0030 0.0020 0.0077 0.0348 
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Figure 2. Average fund’s exposure. 
 
Panel A. The average fund’s monthly exposure to the market excess return and the traded 
Amihud liquidity risk. The exposure is the weighted average of betas or idiosyncratic risk 
of individual stocks held by the average fund, with prior quarter-end holdings as weights. 
I obtain individual stock betas using the regression of stock excess return on market 
excess return and traded Amihud liquidity risk factor, and the previous 60 months of 
observations requiring at least 24 months of observations   
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Panel B. The weighted average of the betas for the stocks bought and sold by the average 
fund. The top one depicts the time-variation of market betas for the stocks bought and 
sold by the average manager for each month. The bottom one depicts the change in 
liquidity betas for the stocks bought and sold by the average manager over the sample 
period 1995-2010. For each quarter, if the number of shares for a stock increased from 
the prior quarter, the stock is defined as “bought;” otherwise as “sold.” Stocks that are 
newly introduced to the current quarter and those that are no longer held in the current 
quarter are classified as “bought” and “sold” stocks, respectively. I compute the weight as 
the absolute value of the change in shares multiplied by the share price of the prior 
quarter-end. I use the prior quarter-end price to reflect the actual trading rather than price 
changes.  
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Reported are the t-test results for the difference in means of the betas of the stocks sold and bought. I report the results only for the last 
quarter of each year to save space. The top one documents the average market betas for the stocks bought and sold, the beta difference, 
and its t-statistics. The bottom one reports the average liquidity betas for the stocks bought and sold, the beta difference, and 
respective t-statistics. The t-statistics are computed under the assumption that the variances of betas of the stocks bought and sold are 
different.  
 
e}~h 1995Q4 1996Q4 1997Q4 1998Q4 1999Q4 2000Q4 2001Q4 2002Q4 2003Q4 2004Q4 2005Q4 2006Q4 2007Q4 2008Q4 2009Q4 2010Q4 
Sell 1.0987 1.0662 1.0370 1.0855 1.2159 1.2122 0.8941 0.9241 1.1497 1.1714 1.0780 1.1489 1.3017 1.1198 1.1600 1.0590 
Buy 1.3596 1.2242 1.1179 1.0566 1.1247 1.0870 0.8962 0.8355 1.1643 0.8383 1.0652 1.0529 1.0856 1.0582 1.1234 1.1180 
Sell - Buy -0.2609 -0.1581 -0.0808 0.0288 0.0913 0.1252 -0.0021 0.0886 -0.0145 0.3331 0.0128 0.0960 0.2161 0.0616 0.0365 -0.0590 
t-statistic -20.97 -11.69 -8.70 3.76 10.82 11.83 -0.20 7.85 -0.89 24.37 0.89 7.33 15.75 6.96 3.44 -6.70 
 
fgV 1995Q4 1996Q4 1997Q4 1998Q4 1999Q4 2000Q4 2001Q4 2002Q4 2003Q4 2004Q4 2005Q4 2006Q4 2007Q4 2008Q4 2009Q4 2010Q4 
Sell 0.0477 0.0555 0.0875 0.2556 0.0792 0.1125 -0.1073 -0.0844 -0.0789 -0.0078 -0.0037 0.0299 0.2293 0.1151 0.0316 -0.0018 
Buy 0.2564 0.1561 0.1494 0.0098 0.1782 -0.0682 -0.0949 -0.1036 -0.0852 -0.0973 0.0587 0.1053 0.0758 0.1546 0.0684 0.0875 
Sell-Buy -0.2087 -0.1006 -0.0619 0.2458 -0.0990 0.1807 -0.0124 0.0191 0.0063 0.0894 -0.0624 -0.0754 0.1535 -0.0395 -0.0368 -0.0893 
t-statistic -16.11 -8.14 -8.62 36.17 -10.64 20.19 -1.99 3.51 1.05 14.10 -8.84 -8.89 14.56 -3.72 -4.27 -12.80 
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Panel C. The dollar amount of betas of the stocks bought and sold by the average 
manager ($ billions). The top one depicts the dollar amount of market betas for the stocks 
bought and sold by the average manager. The bottom one depicts the dollar amount of 
liquidity betas for the stocks bought and sold by the average manager. The dollar amount 
of beta is the weighted sum of betas of the stocks bought and sold by the average fund, 
with weight as the absolute value of the change in shares multiplied by the share price of 
the prior quarter-end. I use the prior quarter-end price to reflect the actual trading rather 
than price changes. For each quarter, if the number of shares for a stock increased from 
the prior quarter, the stock is defined as “bought;” otherwise as “sold.” Stocks that are 
newly introduced to the current quarter and those that are no longer held in the current 
quarter are classified as “bought” and “sold” stocks, respectively 
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Reported are the t-test results for the difference in means of the dollar amount betas multiplied by the number of stocks during the 
corresponding quarter. I report the results only for the last quarter of each year to save space. The top one documents the average 
dollar amount of market betas for the stocks bought and sold, the beta difference, and its t-statistics. The bottom one reports the 
average dollar amount of liquidity betas for the stocks bought and sold, the beta difference, and its t-statistics. The t-statistics are 
computed under the assumption that the variances of betas of the stocks bought and sold are different. 
 
e}~h 1995Q4 1996Q4 1997Q4 1998Q4 1999Q4 2000Q4 2001Q4 2002Q4 2003Q4 2004Q4 2005Q4 2006Q4 2007Q4 2008Q4 2009Q4 2010Q4 
Sell 2.5158 2.3110 1.3162 0.5326 1.6900 0.5285 0.5536 0.4683 0.8044 0.8079 1.5121 1.1107 0.5788 0.9684 0.2340 0.8911 
Buy 1.4541 1.0798 2.5573 1.4331 3.2980 6.4414 1.4083 0.8061 1.8824 1.4057 1.9216 1.1409 4.0541 1.3093 2.4139 1.3269 
Sell - Buy 1.0616 1.2312 -1.2411 -0.9006 -1.6080 -5.9129 -0.8547 -0.3378 -1.0779 -0.5978 -0.4095 -0.0302 -3.4753 -0.3409 -2.1799 -0.4358 
t-statistic 6.22 9.04 -5.80 -8.50 -4.71 -12.43 -6.55 -5.24 -3.15 -3.71 -2.35 -0.32 -17.42 -3.27 -22.83 -5.36 
 
 
fgV 1995Q4 1996Q4 1997Q4 1998Q4 1999Q4 2000Q4 2001Q4 2002Q4 2003Q4 2004Q4 2005Q4 2006Q4 2007Q4 2008Q4 2009Q4 2010Q4 
Sell 0.1092 0.1203 0.1110 0.1254 0.1100 0.0490 -0.0664 -0.0428 -0.0552 -0.0054 -0.0052 0.0289 0.1020 0.0995 0.0064 -0.0015 
Buy 0.2742 0.1377 0.3417 0.0133 0.5220 -0.4039 -0.1490 -0.0999 -0.1376 -0.1631 0.1059 0.1140 0.2829 0.1913 0.1469 0.1039 
Sell-Buy -0.1651 -0.0174 -0.2307 0.1120 -0.4120 0.4530 0.0826 0.0571 0.0825 0.1577 -0.1111 -0.0852 -0.1809 -0.0918 -0.1405 -0.1054 
t-statistic -2.40 -0.33 -5.41 4.52 -3.46 3.88 2.11 3.05 2.09 4.08 -2.29 -2.86 -2.32 -1.37 -3.42 -4.09 
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Panel D. The liquidity of the stocks bought and sold by the average manger. The stock 
level liquidity is measured as the monthly average of the daily liquidity measure which is 
minus one multiplied by the daily ratio of absolute value of stock return to dollar volume 
following Amihud (2002). The top one depicts the time-variation of equally weighted 
average of liquidity for the stocks bought and sold by the average manager for each 
month over the sample period 1995-2010. The bottom one depicts the value-weighted 
average liquidity for the stocks bought and sold by the average manager. To measure 
current quarter’s monthly stock level liquidity I use prior year’s stock price and volume 
to avoid the impact of trading. For each quarter, if the number of shares for a stock 
increased from the prior quarter, the stock is defined as “bought;” otherwise as “sold.” 
Stocks that are newly introduced to the current quarter and those that are no longer held 
in the current quarter are classified as “bought” and “sold” stocks, respectively. I 
compute the weight as the absolute value of the change in shares multiplied by the share 
price of the prior quarter-end. I use the prior quarter-end price to reflect the actual trading 
rather than price changes.  
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Reported are equally weighted (left) and value-weighted (right) quarterly average of the monthly liquidity of the stocks bought and 
sold by the average manager, the mean difference in liquidity between the stocks sold and bought, and its statistical significance. I use 
12 months’ prior liquidity measure for the current month.  
 
EW sell buy sell-buy tValue Probt  VW sell buy sell-buy tValue Probt 
1998Q3 -0.1073 -0.0943 -0.0130 0.89 0.3748  1998Q3 -0.0031 -0.0051 0.0020 2.33 0.0200 
1998Q4 -0.0964 -0.0898 -0.0066 -4.73 <.0001  1998Q4 -0.0075 -0.0041 -0.0034 -2.62 0.0089 
1999Q1 -0.1007 -0.0929 -0.0078 -2.76 0.0059  1999Q1 -0.0046 -0.0062 0.0016 1.69 0.0912 
1999Q2 -0.0716 -0.0765 0.0049 -3.72 0.0002  1999Q2 -0.0070 -0.0024 -0.0046 -4.46 <.0001 
1999Q3 -0.1012 -0.0713 -0.0299 1.33 0.1823  1999Q3 -0.0086 -0.0049 -0.0037 -2.41 0.0159 
1999Q4 -0.0921 -0.0742 -0.0180 -0.96 0.3363  1999Q4 -0.0057 -0.0041 -0.0016 -1.34 0.1792 
2000Q1 -0.1050 -0.0792 -0.0258 -4.11 <.0001  2000Q1 -0.0038 -0.0083 0.0045 3.75 0.0002 
2000Q2 -0.1257 -0.1398 0.0141 -5.15 <.0001  2000Q2 -0.0048 -0.0040 -0.0008 -0.81 0.4178 
2000Q3 -0.1432 -0.1329 -0.0103 -3.98 <.0001  2000Q3 -0.0134 -0.0024 -0.0110 -6.37 <.0001 
2000Q4 -0.1398 -0.0994 -0.0404 -7.62 <.0001  2000Q4 -0.0088 -0.0042 -0.0046 -2.36 0.0183 
2001Q1 -0.1406 -0.0936 -0.0470 -10.34 <.0001  2001Q1 -0.0092 -0.0023 -0.0069 -5.81 <.0001 
2001Q2 -0.1497 -0.1105 -0.0393 -4.41 <.0001  2001Q2 -0.0042 -0.0048 0.0007 0.59 0.5554 
2001Q3 -0.1935 -0.0960 -0.0976 -11.09 <.0001  2001Q3 -0.0111 -0.0023 -0.0088 -4.53 <.0001 
2001Q4 -0.1552 -0.0655 -0.0896 -4.60 <.0001  2001Q4 -0.0032 -0.0060 0.0027 2.17 0.0298 
2002Q1 -0.1688 -0.1184 -0.0504 -5.44 <.0001  2002Q1 -0.0027 -0.0040 0.0013 1.40 0.1616 
2002Q2 -0.2290 -0.0888 -0.1401 2.85 0.0044  2002Q2 -0.0020 -0.0047 0.0027 2.38 0.0176 
2002Q3 -0.1567 -0.1076 -0.0491 -1.61 0.1069  2002Q3 -0.0040 -0.0040 0.0001 0.07 0.9415 
2002Q4 -0.1453 -0.0897 -0.0555 8.36 <.0001  2002Q4 -0.0036 -0.0041 0.0005 0.57 0.5706 
2007Q1 -0.0403 -0.0508 0.0105 -6.97 <.0001  2007Q1 -0.0016 -0.0007 -0.0009 -2.06 0.0391 
2007Q2 -0.0511 -0.0395 -0.0116 4.40 <.0001  2007Q2 -0.0005 -0.0014 0.0008 2.57 0.0102 
2007Q3 -0.0420 -0.0392 -0.0028 -0.97 0.3315  2007Q3 -0.0009 -0.0015 0.0006 1.32 0.1870 
2007Q4 -0.0589 -0.0280 -0.0310 -3.77 0.0002  2007Q4 -0.0017 -0.0005 -0.0011 -2.31 0.0210 
2008Q1 -0.0358 -0.0568 0.0210 2.29 0.0223  2008Q1 -0.0004 -0.0010 0.0006 2.18 0.0291 
2008Q2 -0.0497 -0.0448 -0.0049 -4.39 <.0001  2008Q2 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.27 0.7874 
2008Q3 -0.0527 -0.0344 -0.0183 -1.01 0.3128  2008Q3 -0.0006 -0.0011 0.0005 1.79 0.0739 
2008Q4 -0.0319 -0.0419 0.0101 0.43 0.6663  2008Q4 -0.0008 -0.0014 0.0006 1.17 0.2422 
2009Q1 -0.0457 -0.0274 -0.0183 -2.35 0.0191  2009Q1 -0.0019 -0.0005 -0.0015 -2.75 0.0061 
2009Q2 -0.0479 -0.0433 -0.0046 6.05 <.0001  2009Q2 -0.0005 -0.0011 0.0005 0.73 0.4670 
 60 
Panel E. Pearson correlation coefficients between stock level liquidity and liquidity beta, 
liquidity and market beta, and market beta and liquidity beta. I use stocks held by hedge 
fund managers over 1995-2010. Betas are computed as the coefficient estimates in the 
regression of stock return in excess of risk-free rate on market excess return and traded 
liquidity risk using the prior 60 months observations requiring at least 24 months’ 
observations. The stock level liquidity is measured as the monthly average of the daily 
liquidity measure which is computed as negative signed ratio of absolute value of stock 
return to dollar volume following Amihud (2002). To measure current month’s stock 
level liquidity I use prior 12 months’ stock return and dollar volume to avoid the impact 
of trading.  
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Reported are the Pearson correlation coefficients between liquidity and liquidity beta, liquidity and market beta, and liquidity and 
market betas, and the corresponding p-values. I report only selected quarters to save space. The correlation coefficients are computed 
over a quarter.  
 
prior beta_m, beta_l p-value Liq, beta_l p-value Liq,beta_m p-value 
1998Q3 0.0182 0.5939 -0.0298 0.0093 0.1576 0.0000 
1998Q4 0.0920 0.0016 -0.0115 0.0001 0.1526 0.0000 
1999Q1 0.0827 0.0006 -0.0581 0.0001 0.1418 0.0000 
1999Q2 0.1092 0.0001 -0.0588 0.0000 0.1688 0.0000 
1999Q3 0.0947 0.1865 -0.0514 0.0312 0.1365 0.0000 
1999Q4 0.0677 0.0000 -0.0150 0.4008 0.1147 0.0000 
2000Q1 0.0181 0.0000 -0.0499 0.0000 0.1291 0.0000 
2000Q2 -0.0419 0.0000 -0.0961 0.0000 0.1598 0.0000 
2000Q3 -0.0479 0.0000 -0.1166 0.0002 0.1557 0.0000 
2000Q4 -0.0478 0.0000 -0.1074 0.2758 0.1626 0.0000 
2001Q1 -0.0248 0.1857 -0.0649 0.0003 0.1635 0.0000 
2001Q2 -0.0404 0.0022 -0.0931 0.0000 0.1468 0.0000 
2001Q3 -0.0159 0.0005 -0.0934 0.0000 0.1391 0.0000 
2001Q4 0.0486 0.0006 -0.1177 0.0000 0.1496 0.0000 
2002Q1 -0.0219 0.0763 -0.1601 0.0000 0.1632 0.0000 
2002Q2 -0.0097 0.0042 -0.1286 0.0000 0.1626 0.0000 
2002Q3 -0.0303 0.2662 -0.1610 0.0000 0.1625 0.0000 
2002Q4 -0.0299 0.0008 -0.1358 0.0000 0.1592 0.0000 
2007Q1 -0.1152 0.0000 0.0218 0.3872 0.1241 0.0000 
2007Q2 -0.0507 0.0000 -0.0056 0.8673 0.1305 0.0000 
2007Q3 -0.0736 0.0000 -0.0052 0.2491 0.1476 0.0000 
2007Q4 -0.1622 0.0000 -0.0340 0.2349 0.1515 0.0000 
2008Q1 -0.1000 0.0000 0.0057 0.1099 0.1385 0.0000 
2008Q2 -0.0809 0.0002 -0.0268 0.6825 0.1597 0.0000 
2008Q3 -0.1642 0.0000 -0.0162 0.7056 0.1951 0.0000 
2008Q4 -0.3790 0.0000 -0.0338 0.0127 0.1162 0.0000 
2009Q1 -0.2471 0.0000 0.0355 0.6730 0.0796 0.0000 
2009Q2 -0.2480 0.0000 0.0412 0.0483 0.1056 0.0000 
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Table 3. Hedge fund managers subject to 13F filings and their stock holdings. 
 
Panel A. Proportion of hedge fund managers subject to 13F filings and the corresponding 
hedge funds. The affiliation information is from the TASS snapshot as of April 25th, 2012. 
I obtain the 13F filers’ names and their 13F equity holdings information from the 
Thomson Reuters Institutional (13F) Holdings database. To identify hedge fund 
managers subject to 13F filings, I first create a list of non-duplicate hedge fund managers’ 
names over the sample period, where hedge fund managers are defined as either a 
“management company” or “investment company” in a company type field in the TASS 
database. Also, I make a list of non-duplicate 13F filers’ names over the sample period. 
Then I manually match the hedge fund managers’ names to the 13F filers’ names. I 
include all the funds as long as at least one month observation exists for each year. “Final” 
refers to the managers and the corresponding hedge funds contained in the final sample 
right before the estimation.  
 
year 
Number of HF managers Number of hedge funds 
13F HF 
mgrs all 13F % 13F final 
13F 
match all TASS %TASS 
1995 21 1,333 1.58% 24 452 1,482 1.62% 
1996 48 1,449 3.31% 68 560 1,805 3.77% 
1997 66 1,551 4.26% 129 678 2,112 6.11% 
1998 94 1,698 5.54% 177 794 2,439 7.26% 
1999 117 1,871 6.25% 276 958 2,834 9.74% 
2000 143 2,017 7.09% 342 1,162 3,278 10.43% 
2001 214 2,156 9.93% 486 1,397 3,938 12.34% 
2002 248 2,239 11.08% 585 1,672 4,721 12.39% 
2003 264 2,206 11.97% 764 2,015 5,779 13.22% 
2004 299 2,313 12.93% 927 2,412 7,109 13.04% 
2005 348 2,529 13.76% 1,203 2,780 8,366 14.38% 
2006 393 2,704 14.53% 1,388 3,025 9,443 14.70% 
2007 451 2,954 15.27% 1,706 3,345 10,454 16.32% 
2008 513 3,216 15.95% 1,906 3,427 10,702 17.81% 
2009 509 3,248 15.67% 1,717 3,290 10,030 17.12% 
2010 462 3,186 14.50% 1,484 3,139 9,275 16.00% 
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Panel B. Number of stocks held by 13F filers managing hedge funds and the quarterly 
total equity capitalization for each year. 
 
year 
Number of stocks 
per manager per quarter 
Total equity holding per manager per 
quarter ($mil) 
Total 
equity 
per qtr 
mean q1 median q3 mean q1 median q3 %CRSP 
1995 426 38 85 240 4,333 171 549 1,560 1.17% 
1996 341 35 72 249 4,921 144 437 1,639 2.58% 
1997 281 30 73 218 5,036 164 455 1,870 3.32% 
1998 265 36 70 227 4,816 146 433 2,266 3.62% 
1999 293 37 91 220 6,446 172 463 2,512 5.12% 
2000 325 37 91 234 8,116 185 540 3,293 6.00% 
2001 332 32 87 233 8,688 110 360 2,374 12.12% 
2002 330 35 83 230 8,127 94 331 1,688 14.68% 
2003 326 38 86 247 7,579 108 339 1,559 16.01% 
2004 326 37 84 266 9,006 138 413 2,005 17.09% 
2005 294 32 75 248 8,917 139 452 2,096 17.78% 
2006 283 29 68 212 8,682 159 436 1,783 17.83% 
2007 287 28 67 216 10,054 163 488 2,062 20.68% 
2008 298 23 58 202 8,658 118 415 2,159 22.55% 
2009 323 20 60 216 6,583 65 277 1,787 24.23% 
2010 354 26 73 265 9,183 127 454 3,008 24.53% 
 
 
Panel C. Summary statistics of the assets under management (AUM, $ thousands) at the 
individual fund level. I use monthly non-missing AUM, converted to USD, as of the last 
day of each corresponding month. “HFs” stands for hedge funds. AUM is obtained from 
the TASS database, and currency exchange rate information is obtained from WRDS 
Federal Reserve Bank.  
 
 n mean std q1 med q3 
Final sample 99,150 248,336 768,803 17,143 56,682 181,564 
13F HFs 209,265 198,235 632,000 13,162 46,000 150,182 
Non-13F HFs 378,689 94,369 267,616 6,580 23,924 77,658 
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Table 4. Analysis at Portfolio Level I.  
 
I estimate the average fund’s alphas by solving equations (6d) to (6f) subject to (6a) to 
(6c) and (6g) using the GMM method with a Newey-West lag of three. I apply prior 
quarter-end holdings information to the current quarter information. Because only two 
funds met my criteria in 1994, the sample for estimation runs from 1995 until 2010. The 
basic method to form a portfolio is given in the example below; that is, for equally 
weighted portfolios, the weight is one over the number of managers during the 
corresponding quarter, while for value-weighted portfolios, it is determined by the prior 
quarter-end total equity holdings. 
 
Panel A. A simple example of showing how to form a portfolio. Consider two funds A 
and B and the stock universe consisting of three stocks 1, 2, and 3. For an equally 
weighted portfolio, I take the average of the positions of the individual managers, with 
one over the number of managers of the quarter as an equal weight; for a value-weighted 
portfolio I take the average of the positions of the individual managers with total equity 
holdings of the prior quarter-end as weights. EWP and VWP stand for equally weighted 
portfolio and value-weighted portfolio, respectively.  
 
Number of 
shares held Fund A Fund B 
Quarter-
end price 
Stock1    
Stock2 < < < 
Stock3 A 
 
A 
Total holdings :   !   < ! <  A ! A :   !   < ! < 
 
 
 
Weight Fund A Fund B EWP VWP 
Stock1 : 
 ! 

 3: 
 ! 

 
  3
2
 
 !   3 ! 
  
 
Stock2 <: 
< ! <

 3<: 
< ! <

 
<  3<
2
 
< !   3< ! 
  
 
Stock3 A: 
A ! A

 3A: 
0 ! A

 
A  0
2
 
A !   0 ! 
  
 
Total 1 1 1 1 
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Panel B. Estimates of the equally weighted portfolio (average fund) without conditioning 
information. I estimate the average fund’s alphas by solving equations (6d) to (6f) with 
the market-wide parameter estimates reported in panel B of Table 1. I apply prior quarter-
end holdings information to the current quarter information, and the GMM method with a 
Newey-West lag of three. The estimation period is 1995-2010. 
 
Parameter Estimate StdErr t-value Probt p.a. 
 0.0002 0.0032 0.05 0.9595 0.20% 
 -0.0006 0.0005 -1.16 0.2489 -0.67% 
7 0.0001 0.0007 0.18 0.8598 0.16% 
8 0.0020 0.0008 2.54 0.012 2.41% 
 -0.0003 0.0038 -0.07 0.9432 -0.32% 
ef 0.0017 0.0038 0.45 0.651 2.08% 
 
Panel C. Estimates of the equally weighted portfolio with conditioning information. The 
market-wide parameters are estimated by putting market-wide parameters as linear 
functions of instruments which are the lagged three-month Treasury bill yield, the lagged 
dividend price ratio, the lagged term spread, the lagged default return spread, and a 
dummy variable for the month of January. I apply prior quarter-end holdings information 
to the current quarter information, and the GMM method with a Newey-West lag of three. 
The estimation period is 1995-2010.  
 
Parameter Estimate StdErr t-value Probt p.a. 
 0.0002 0.0033 0.06 0.9508 0.25% 
 -0.0003 0.0005 -0.61 0.5459 -0.40% 
7 0.0003 0.0010 0.26 0.797 0.32% 
8 0.0020 0.0008 2.37 0.0186 2.39% 
 0.0001 0.0037 0.04 0.9694 0.17% 
ef 0.0021 0.0038 0.56 0.5784 2.56% 
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Figure 3. Dynamics of Alpha.  
 
The figures depict the dynamics of alphas (percent per year) of the equally weighted 
portfolio over time. For each year (quarter), I compute each alpha by solving the Euler 
equations (6d) to (6f) subject to (6a), (6c), and (6g), using 12 months full observations. I 
apply prior quarter-end holdings information to the current quarter information, and the 
GMM method with a Newey-West lag of three. The estimation period is 1995-2010. 
 
Panel A. Under unconditional model. 
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Reported are the monthly alpha estimates of yearly performance, the corresponding standard errors, and the t-statistics.  
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Selectivity 
Estimate -0.0041 0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0022 0.0033 0.0120 0.0027 -0.0003 0.0052 0.0024 0.0015 0.0003 0.0003 0.0032 0.0059 0.0015 
StdErr 0.0012 0.0017 0.0016 0.0030 0.0036 0.0033 0.0037 0.0034 0.0018 0.0016 0.0014 0.0014 0.0009 0.0038 0.0036 0.0012 
t-value -3.60 0.49 -0.41 -0.73 0.92 3.60 0.74 -0.08 2.86 1.48 1.10 0.24 0.32 0.85 1.65 1.24 
Timing 
Estimate 0.0153 0.0072 0.0081 -0.0006 0.0109 -0.0110 -0.0158 -0.0240 0.0181 0.0073 0.0023 0.0073 0.0007 -0.0491 0.0139 0.0051 
StdErr 0.0038 0.0053 0.0073 0.0173 0.0088 0.0126 0.0111 0.0113 0.0071 0.0068 0.0049 0.0065 0.0059 0.0241 0.0174 0.0140 
t-value 4.01 1.36 1.11 -0.04 1.23 -0.88 -1.42 -2.13 2.54 1.08 0.48 1.12 0.11 -2.03 0.80 0.36 
Total 
Estimate 0.0112 0.0081 0.0074 -0.0028 0.0142 0.0010 -0.0131 -0.0242 0.0232 0.0097 0.0039 0.0076 0.0009 -0.0459 0.0198 0.0066 
StdErr 0.0045 0.0052 0.0075 0.0177 0.0096 0.0097 0.0130 0.0140 0.0077 0.0081 0.0059 0.0072 0.0052 0.0262 0.0157 0.0131 
t-value 2.48 1.55 0.98 -0.16 1.49 0.10 -1.00 -1.72 3.02 1.20 0.65 1.06 0.18 -1.75 1.26 0.50 
Liquidity 
Estimate -0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0020 -0.0036 0.0017 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 0.0005 -0.0035 -0.0003 -0.0003 
StdErr 0.0013 0.0018 0.0022 0.0026 0.0012 0.0042 0.0004 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0009 0.0012 0.0033 0.0013 0.0003 
t-value -0.73 -0.16 -0.88 -1.39 1.36 -0.06 -0.40 1.41 -2.73 1.73 2.24 -0.02 0.44 -1.04 -0.24 -0.88 
Market 
Estimate 0.0132 0.0052 0.0097 0.0069 0.0082 -0.0149 -0.0124 -0.0200 0.0161 0.0032 -0.0017 0.0030 -0.0031 -0.0389 0.0183 0.0097 
StdErr 0.0026 0.0055 0.0066 0.0139 0.0087 0.0085 0.0103 0.0112 0.0077 0.0069 0.0049 0.0063 0.0051 0.0172 0.0157 0.0138 
t-value 4.97 0.95 1.48 0.50 0.95 -1.76 -1.20 -1.78 2.09 0.46 -0.35 0.48 -0.60 -2.26 1.17 0.71 
Volatility 
Estimate 0.0031 0.0023 0.0003 -0.0040 0.0010 0.0041 -0.0032 -0.0042 0.0025 0.0040 0.0038 0.0043 0.0032 -0.0067 -0.0041 -0.0044 
StdErr 0.0002 0.0010 0.0010 0.0033 0.0011 0.0020 0.0015 0.0033 0.0006 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0056 0.0024 0.0019 
t-value 18.65 2.36 0.33 -1.20 0.95 2.03 -2.13 -1.28 3.98 13.17 20.32 19.89 8.43 -1.22 -1.70 -2.24 
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Panel B. Under conditional model.  
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Reported are the monthly alpha estimates of yearly performance, the corresponding standard errors and t-statistics. 
 
 
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Selectivity 
Estimate -0.0035 0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0031 0.0032 0.0127 0.0011 -0.0016 0.0046 0.0017 0.0015 0.0011 0.0001 0.0061 0.0051 0.0020 
StdErr 0.0009 0.0021 0.0016 0.0033 0.0040 0.0031 0.0036 0.0042 0.0015 0.0017 0.0014 0.0018 0.0009 0.0019 0.0034 0.0015 
t-value -3.79 0.45 -0.15 -0.93 0.81 4.06 0.30 -0.39 2.97 0.96 1.10 0.59 0.13 3.16 1.52 1.33 
Timing 
Estimate 0.0153 0.0045 0.0000 -0.0056 0.0098 -0.0076 -0.0143 -0.0202 0.0129 0.0043 0.0023 0.0096 0.0019 -0.0426 0.0315 0.0005 
StdErr 0.0052 0.0079 0.0082 0.0212 0.0088 0.0092 0.0101 0.0151 0.0059 0.0070 0.0050 0.0079 0.0055 0.0202 0.0158 0.0152 
t-value 2.92 0.57 0.00 -0.26 1.11 -0.82 -1.42 -1.34 2.18 0.62 0.46 1.21 0.34 -2.11 1.99 0.03 
Total 
Estimate 0.0118 0.0054 -0.0002 -0.0086 0.0130 0.0052 -0.0132 -0.0219 0.0175 0.0060 0.0038 0.0107 0.0020 -0.0365 0.0366 0.0025 
StdErr 0.0056 0.0066 0.0077 0.0221 0.0088 0.0074 0.0123 0.0184 0.0063 0.0084 0.0061 0.0093 0.0048 0.0203 0.0185 0.0141 
t-value 2.11 0.82 -0.03 -0.39 1.49 0.70 -1.07 -1.19 2.77 0.71 0.63 1.16 0.41 -1.80 1.98 0.18 
Liquidity 
Estimate 0.0007 0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0035 0.0013 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0007 0.0012 -0.0045 -0.0007 -0.0007 
StdErr 0.0016 0.0024 0.0027 0.0026 0.0013 0.0044 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0009 0.0013 0.0038 0.0014 0.0003 
t-value 0.43 0.65 -0.56 -1.37 0.98 0.02 -0.45 1.30 -1.87 0.81 2.32 0.78 0.91 -1.19 -0.49 -2.28 
Market 
Estimate 0.0133 0.0026 0.0079 0.0055 0.0090 -0.0125 -0.0133 -0.0200 0.0133 -0.0057 -0.0037 0.0061 0.0002 -0.0330 0.0297 0.0039 
StdErr 0.0038 0.0075 0.0080 0.0150 0.0094 0.0077 0.0104 0.0122 0.0075 0.0081 0.0058 0.0071 0.0057 0.0169 0.0175 0.0137 
t-value 3.53 0.35 0.99 0.37 0.96 -1.62 -1.27 -1.63 1.77 -0.71 -0.63 0.85 0.04 -1.95 1.70 0.28 
Volatility 
Estimate 0.0012 0.0003 -0.0064 -0.0075 -0.0005 0.0049 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0100 0.0057 0.0029 0.0005 -0.0051 0.0025 -0.0027 
StdErr 0.0022 0.0052 0.0034 0.0067 0.0020 0.0037 0.0020 0.0033 0.0030 0.0015 0.0012 0.0019 0.0017 0.0022 0.0071 0.0024 
t-value 0.56 0.05 -1.90 -1.12 -0.25 1.31 -0.45 -0.15 -0.02 6.80 4.85 1.48 0.27 -2.30 0.36 -1.12 
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Table 5. Analysis at Portfolio Level II. 
 
I estimate the alphas for the equally weighted portfolio for each sub-period, which is split 
according to widely accepted structural break points. I apply prior quarter-end holdings 
information to the current quarter information. The estimation method is GMM with a 
Newey-West lag of three. Sub-periods are the period up to LTCM collapse and just 
before the tech bubble (January 1995 to September 1998), the tech bubble (October 1998 
to March 2000), the NASDAQ crash, the accounting scandal and September 11 attacks 
(April 2000 to October 2002), the period leading up to the mortgage crisis (November 
2002 to June 2007), the recent financial crisis (July 2007 to December 2008), and the 
remaining period (January 2009 to December 2010). 
 
199501-199809 
Parameter Estimate StdErr t-value Probt p.a. 
 0.0064 0.0042 1.54 0.1307 7.76% 
 -0.0021 0.0011 -1.88 0.0668 -2.47% 
7 0.0007 0.0012 0.57 0.5745 0.82% 
8 -0.0010 0.0009 -1.11 0.2712 -1.24% 
 0.0051 0.0055 0.92 0.3608 6.11% 
ef 0.0040 0.0057 0.71 0.4786 4.86% 
 
199810-200003 
Parameter Estimate StdErr t-value Probt p.a. 
 0.0134 0.0070 1.91 0.0728 16.07% 
 0.0033 0.0024 1.41 0.1758 4.00% 
7 0.0019 0.0016 1.21 0.2429 2.27% 
8 0.0009 0.0034 0.26 0.8004 1.03% 
 0.0186 0.0081 2.3 0.0347 22.34% 
ef 0.0194 0.0070 2.77 0.0132 23.38% 
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200004-200210 
Parameter Estimate StdErr t-value Probt p.a. 
 -0.0185 0.0062 -3 0.0055 -22.31% 
 -0.0010 0.0011 -0.92 0.3649 -1.24% 
7 -0.0020 0.0016 -1.2 0.2406 -2.35% 
8 0.0049 0.0032 1.54 0.1340 5.87% 
 -0.0215 0.0072 -2.97 0.0058 -25.89% 
ef -0.0166 0.0083 -2 0.0547 -20.02% 
 
200211-200706 
Parameter Estimate StdErr t-value Probt p.a. 
 0.0048 0.0033 1.44 0.1555 5.74% 
 0.0002 0.0003 0.81 0.4214 0.30% 
7 0.0033 0.0004 9.25 <.0001 4.00% 
8 0.0023 0.0009 2.63 0.0111 2.78% 
 0.0083 0.0032 2.59 0.0122 10.04% 
ef 0.0107 0.0037 2.92 0.0051 12.81% 
 
200707-200812 
Parameter Estimate StdErr t-value Probt p.a. 
 -0.0293 0.0132 -2.22 0.0407 -35.27% 
 -0.0028 0.0023 -1.21 0.2412 -3.38% 
7 -0.0035 0.0042 -0.85 0.4092 -4.26% 
8 0.0025 0.0026 0.95 0.3554 2.99% 
 -0.0357 0.0185 -1.93 0.0701 -42.91% 
ef -0.0332 0.0193 -1.72 0.1038 -39.92% 
 
200901-201012 
Parameter Estimate StdErr t-value Probt p.a. 
 0.0140 0.0104 1.34 0.1922 16.86% 
 -0.0003 0.0006 -0.45 0.6604 -0.34% 
7 -0.0042 0.0016 -2.64 0.0146 -5.10% 
8 0.0037 0.0020 1.9 0.0699 4.48% 
 0.0095 0.0112 0.85 0.4037 11.42% 
ef 0.0132 0.0105 1.26 0.2213 15.90% 
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Table 6. Capital Constraints. 
 
Using the TASS snapshot as of April 25, 2012, managers are ranked according to the 
length of the lock-up period, redemption-notice periods, and average leverage (debt over 
AUM). Because a manager is usually matched to multiple funds, I rank each manager 
according to the average of each variable across funds. Then I form a portfolio of going 
long the funds with the strongest share restrictions or highest average leverage, and short 
those with the weakest share restrictions or lowest average leverage. Depicted are the 
alpha differences (percent per year) of the top and bottom portfolios for each capital 
constraint. I apply prior quarter-end holdings information to the current quarter 
information, and the GMM method with a Newey-West lag of three. The estimation 
period is 1995-2010.  
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Panel A. Lock-up period. I split the sample into two sub-samples. The mean lock-up 
period for the top portfolio (343 managers) is 9.34 months and that for the bottom (298 
managers) is 0. 
 
Parameter Estimate StdErr t-value Probt p.a. 
 0.0001 0.0002 0.38 0.7041 0.09% 
 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.22 0.8259 -0.06% 
7 0.0001 0.0001 1.01 0.312 0.15% 
8 0.0008 0.0005 1.70 0.0909 0.93% 
 0.0001 0.0003 0.44 0.6605 0.18% 
ef 0.0009 0.0006 1.56 0.1194 1.11% 
 
Panel B. Redemption-notice period. I break the sample down into three sub-samples. The 
mean redemption-notice period for the top tercile portfolio (176 managers) is 68.17 
months and that for the bottom (178 managers) is 11.76 months. 
 
Parameter Estimate StdErr t-value Probt p.a. 
 0.0005 0.0003 1.60 0.1106 0.64% 
 0.0001 0.0003 0.36 0.7173 0.11% 
7 0.0001 0.0001 1.70 0.0909 0.18% 
8 0.0011 0.0006 1.93 0.0548 1.36% 
 0.0008 0.0004 1.90 0.0597 0.93% 
ef 0.0019 0.0007 2.90 0.0042 2.29% 
 
Panel C. Average leverage. I split the sample into two sub-samples because more than 
half of the sample (349 managers) reports average leverage of 0%. The mean leverage for 
non-zero average leverage managers (292 managers) is 90.73%. 
 
Parameter Estimate StdErr t-value Probt p.a. 
 0.0000 0.0002 0.02 0.9876 0.00% 
 0.0002 0.0002 1.19 0.2345 0.22% 
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.78 0.4341 0.04% 
8 0.0004 0.0004 0.9 0.3709 0.42% 
 0.0002 0.0003 0.75 0.4548 0.26% 
ef 0.0006 0.0005 1.22 0.2223 0.69% 
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Figure 4. Capital Constraints. 
 
Using the TASS snapshot as of April 25, 2012, managers are ranked according to the 
length of the lock-up period and redemption-notice period, and average leverage (debt 
over AUM). Because a manager is usually matched to multiple funds, I rank each 
manager according to the average of each variable across its funds. Then I form a 
portfolio of going long the funds with the strongest share restrictions or highest average 
leverage, and short those with the weakest share restrictions or lowest average leverage. 
Then I estimate the portfolio alphas by solving equations (6d) to (6f) subject to (6a) to (6c) 
and (6g) using the GMM method with a Newey-West lag of three, and full 12 months of 
observations. I apply prior quarter-end holdings information to the current quarter 
information. Depicted are the yearly alpha differences (percent per year) between the top 
and bottom portfolios for each capital constraint.  
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Panel A. Lock-up period. I split the sample into two sub-samples. The mean lock-up 
period for the top portfolio (343 managers) is 9.34 months and that for the bottom (298 
managers) is 0. 
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Reported are the monthly alpha estimates of yearly performance, the corresponding standard errors and t-statistics. 
 
 
 
. 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Selectivity 
Estimate 0.0020 -0.0011 -0.0017 -0.0013 0.0043 0.0046 0.0028 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0011 -0.0020 0.0011 0.0021 0.0005 
StdErr 0.0013 0.0029 0.0018 0.0016 0.0019 0.0019 0.0011 0.0010 0.0012 0.0005 0.0003 0.0009 0.0009 0.0012 0.0012 0.0008 
t-value 1.53 -0.39 -0.93 -0.81 2.30 2.41 2.63 0.08 0.17 0.10 -1.21 1.18 -2.16 0.90 1.79 0.64 
Timing 
Estimate -0.0025 -0.0009 0.0000 -0.0013 0.0003 0.0036 0.0013 0.0024 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0002 
StdErr 0.0006 0.0014 0.0012 0.0013 0.0006 0.0032 0.0004 0.0011 0.0007 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0004 0.0013 0.0003 0.0004 
t-value -4.39 -0.68 0.01 -0.94 0.46 1.12 3.20 2.11 -0.79 -0.28 2.38 -0.37 -0.08 0.30 -1.00 -0.47 
Total 
Estimate -0.0005 -0.0021 -0.0017 -0.0026 0.0046 0.0082 0.0042 0.0025 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0010 -0.0021 0.0015 0.0018 0.0004 
StdErr 0.0018 0.0029 0.0022 0.0013 0.0017 0.0042 0.0012 0.0011 0.0007 0.0006 0.0003 0.0010 0.0013 0.0006 0.0011 0.0009 
t-value -0.29 -0.72 -0.75 -2.00 2.72 1.98 3.54 2.30 -0.50 -0.01 -0.80 0.94 -1.63 2.52 1.61 0.40 
Liquidity 
Estimate -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0008 0.0009 0.0005 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0007 0.0002 -0.0001 
StdErr 0.0002 0.0009 0.0011 0.0009 0.0008 0.0026 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0011 0.0005 0.0001 
t-value -2.64 -0.36 -0.66 -0.97 1.21 0.21 0.61 0.74 3.54 1.90 -0.83 -1.04 0.37 -0.68 0.43 -0.43 
Market 
Estimate -0.0016 -0.0006 0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0014 0.0010 0.0020 -0.0007 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0001 
StdErr 0.0004 0.0007 0.0006 0.0010 0.0006 0.0010 0.0005 0.0011 0.0007 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 0.0005 0.0003 
t-value -4.56 -0.92 0.83 -0.59 -0.88 1.50 2.14 1.85 -0.94 -1.07 1.30 -0.08 -0.23 1.80 -1.08 -0.24 
Volatility 
Estimate -0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0016 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 
StdErr 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0017 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 
t-value -3.41 0.11 2.14 1.13 -1.14 0.95 1.78 1.40 -3.73 -0.66 2.54 1.61 -2.86 0.22 -0.22 -1.56 
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Panel B. Redemption-notice period. I break the sample down into three sub-samples. The 
mean redemption-notice period for the top tercile portfolio (174 managers) is 68 months 
and that for the bottom (172 managers) is 12 months.  
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Reported are the monthly alpha estimates of yearly performance, the corresponding standard errors and t-statistics. 
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Selectivity 
Estimate 0.0023 0.0030 0.0021 0.0042 -0.0007 -0.0027 0.0010 0.0004 -0.0009 0.0011 -0.0022 0.0029 0.0039 0.0016 
StdErr 0.0013 0.0012 0.0022 0.0040 0.0021 0.0023 0.0012 0.0017 0.0007 0.0015 0.0011 0.0012 0.0029 0.0015 
t-value 1.77 2.43 0.95 1.04 -0.34 -1.15 0.78 0.22 -1.45 0.73 -2.06 2.49 1.37 1.08 
Timing 
Estimate 0.0002 -0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 0.0044 0.0034 0.0012 0.0008 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0023 -0.0011 0.0003 
StdErr 0.0013 0.0032 0.0005 0.0012 0.0012 0.0014 0.0005 0.0006 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0020 0.0011 0.0004 
t-value 0.16 -0.24 -0.03 0.03 3.60 2.47 2.36 1.20 0.77 0.10 -0.54 1.14 -0.97 0.70 
Total 
Estimate 0.0025 0.0022 0.0021 0.0042 0.0037 0.0007 0.0022 0.0011 -0.0006 0.0011 -0.0024 0.0052 0.0029 0.0018 
StdErr 0.0020 0.0024 0.0025 0.0048 0.0022 0.0025 0.0013 0.0018 0.0008 0.0015 0.0014 0.0018 0.0031 0.0016 
t-value 1.21 0.94 0.86 0.88 1.65 0.27 1.66 0.62 -0.80 0.71 -1.78 2.95 0.92 1.14 
Liquidity 
Estimate 0.0003 -0.0015 -0.0001 -0.0016 0.0017 0.0001 0.0016 0.0010 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0002 0.0001 
StdErr 0.0013 0.0008 0.0001 0.0019 0.0014 0.0007 0.0006 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0005 0.0001 
t-value 0.21 -1.99 -0.83 -0.82 1.26 0.18 2.84 2.26 0.51 -1.08 0.48 -2.08 0.39 1.67 
Market 
Estimate 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0014 0.0023 0.0030 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0025 -0.0016 0.0000 
StdErr 0.0001 0.0026 0.0005 0.0012 0.0012 0.0011 0.0006 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0016 0.0008 0.0004 
t-value 1.02 -0.03 0.12 1.22 1.99 2.75 -0.26 -1.11 0.45 0.35 -0.96 1.59 -2.12 0.06 
Volatility 
Estimate -0.0002 0.0008 0.0000 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 
StdErr 0.0001 0.0007 0.0001 0.0006 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0002 0.0000 
t-value -1.89 1.28 0.14 0.31 1.30 0.77 -3.10 -0.16 1.68 2.33 -4.16 0.70 1.48 3.96 
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Panel C. Average leverage. I split the sample into two sub-samples because more than 
half of the sample (349 managers) reports average leverage of 0%. The average leverage 
for non-zero average leverage managers (292 managers) is 90.73%.  
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Reported are the monthly alpha estimates of yearly performance, the corresponding standard errors and t-statistics. 
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Selectivity 
Estimate 0.0021 -0.0005 0.0028 0.0011 0.0038 0.0010 -0.0012 0.0014 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0004 0.0008 -0.0017 -0.0026 -0.0006 
StdErr 0.0023 0.0028 0.0012 0.0014 0.0010 0.0015 0.0015 0.0014 0.0012 0.0008 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0013 0.0014 0.0004 
t-value 0.89 -0.19 2.23 0.75 3.61 0.71 -0.80 0.97 -0.40 -0.17 -0.83 0.74 1.83 -1.35 -1.90 -1.33 
Timing 
Estimate -0.0005 0.0006 0.0012 0.0001 0.0002 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0024 -0.0020 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0000 0.0031 -0.0011 0.0000 
StdErr 0.0007 0.0008 0.0014 0.0009 0.0006 0.0015 0.0010 0.0011 0.0014 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0018 0.0007 0.0007 
t-value -0.66 0.75 0.82 0.15 0.44 0.33 -0.45 2.22 -1.46 0.02 -0.46 -1.82 -0.04 1.74 -1.64 0.00 
Total 
Estimate 0.0016 0.0001 0.0039 0.0012 0.0040 0.0015 -0.0016 0.0038 -0.0025 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0008 0.0014 -0.0037 -0.0006 
StdErr 0.0029 0.0023 0.0018 0.0013 0.0009 0.0020 0.0018 0.0020 0.0008 0.0007 0.0004 0.0007 0.0004 0.0018 0.0016 0.0009 
t-value 0.57 0.03 2.23 0.91 4.30 0.76 -0.91 1.94 -3.20 -0.18 -1.11 -0.21 1.99 0.73 -2.38 -0.69 
Liquidity 
Estimate 0.0001 0.0009 0.0014 0.0006 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0005 -0.0008 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0006 0.0002 -0.0001 
StdErr 0.0003 0.0003 0.0014 0.0004 0.0002 0.0013 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 0.0005 0.0001 
t-value 0.34 2.76 1.03 1.56 0.85 -0.24 -0.81 0.92 -2.20 1.21 -0.23 -1.93 0.81 1.73 0.34 -2.06 
Market 
Estimate -0.0006 -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0001 0.0006 -0.0002 0.0018 -0.0011 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0020 -0.0013 -0.0001 
StdErr 0.0004 0.0007 0.0005 0.0007 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0012 0.0011 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0013 0.0012 0.0007 
t-value -1.25 -0.53 0.29 -0.92 0.15 1.06 -0.39 1.45 -1.02 -2.11 0.48 -0.58 0.59 1.57 -1.16 -0.11 
Volatility 
Estimate 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0000 0.0002 
StdErr 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 
t-value -0.04 0.85 -4.90 1.20 0.35 0.83 0.54 1.11 -1.26 -0.28 -5.58 -2.41 -3.78 1.19 0.51 2.05 
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Table 7. Non-Long Equity Positions 
 
Panel A. Returns-Based Measure. I use those hedge funds whose managers are matched 
to the managers in the final sample. I control for backfill bias by choosing the return 
observations after a fund was added to the TASS database. Then I form an equally 
weighted portfolio by computing the average return across the funds for each month over 
the January 1995 to December 2010. I obtain the (timing) performance estimates 
following Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Cao et al. (2012). That is, the market timing, 
liquidity timing, and volatility timing are measured as the coefficient estimates of , S, 
and W, respectively, in the following regression: 
FF,    OPQ=R<  SOPQ=R ! JTUV  WOPQ=R ! XTYV  RZ7 H\.], 
where FF, is the portfolio return in excess of risk-free rate at month t, OPQ=R is the 
market excess return in month t, JTUV  the demeaned traded Amihud liquidity factor, 
XTYV the demeaned VIX, and  RZ7 H\.] the Fung and Hsieh seven factors, which 
include trend following factors (bond  (PTFSBD), currency (PTFSFX), and commodity 
(PTFSCOM)), equity-oriented risk factors (equity market (MKTRF), size spread factor 
(SMB)), and bond-oriented risk factors (bond market (YLDCHG), credit spread factor 
(BAAMTSY)). VIX (Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Market Volatility Index) 
data are obtained from CBOE website. 
 
Parameter Estimate StdErr DF t-value Probt 
Intercept 0.0033 0.0012 191 2.83 0.0051 
MKTRF 0.2768 0.0223 191 12.44 <.0001 
OPQ=R< -0.0638 0.4040 191 -0.16 0.8747 
OPQ=R ! JTUV -0.1203 0.3510 191 -0.34 0.7322 
OPQ=R ! XTYV 0.0161 0.1921 191 0.08 0.9331 
SMB 0.1271 0.0337 191 3.77 0.0002 
YLDCHG -0.0166 0.0038 191 -4.31 <.0001 
BAAMTSY -0.0288 0.0078 191 -3.70 0.0003 
PTFSBD -0.0088 0.0062 191 -1.42 0.1560 
PTFSFX 0.0119 0.0069 191 1.73 0.0853 
PTFSCOM 0.0098 0.0086 191 1.14 0.2567 
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Panel B. Derivatives Users vs. Non-Users. I use the average of the “Derivatives” 
indicator across funds for each manager. The indicator is from the TASS snapshot as of 
April 25, 2012. I split the sample into two sub-samples because more than half are non-
users (173 managers are classified as users and 468 as non-users). I form an equally 
weighed portfolio of going long positions of the derivative users and short those of the 
non-users. Then I estimate the individual funds’ alphas by solving equations (6d) to (6f) 
subject to (6a) to (6c) and (6g) using the GMM method with a Newey-West lag of three 
and full 12 months of observation. I apply prior quarter-end holdings information to the 
current quarter information. 
 
Parameter Estimate StdErr t-value Probt p.a. 
 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.53 0.5994 -0.11% 
 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.81 0.4189 -0.23% 
7 -0.0001 0.0001 -1.64 0.1028 -0.14% 
8 0.0001 0.0004 0.3 0.7644 0.13% 
 -0.0004 0.0003 -1.26 0.2109 -0.47% 
ef -0.0003 0.0004 -0.74 0.4608 -0.34% 
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Figure 5. Non-Long Equity Positions. 
 
Panel A. Returns-based measure. I use those hedge funds whose managers are matched to 
the managers in the final sample. I control for backfill bias by choosing the return 
observations after a fund was added to the TASS database. Then I form an equally 
weighted portfolio by computing the average return across the funds for each month over 
the January 1995 to December 2010. I obtain the (timing) performance estimates 
following Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Cao et al. (2012). That is, the market timing, 
liquidity timing, and volatility timing are measured as the coefficient estimates, , S, and 
W, respectively, in the following regression: 
FF,    OPQ=R<  SOPQ=R ! JTUV  WOPQ=R ! XTYV  RZ7 H\.], 
where FF, is the portfolio return in excess of risk-free rate at month t, OPQ=R is the 
market excess return in month t, JTUV  the demeaned traded Amihud liquidity factor, 
XTYV the demeaned VIX, and  RZ7 H\.] the Fung and Hsieh seven factors, which 
include trend following factors (bond  (PTFSBD), currency (PTFSFX), and commodity 
(PTFSCOM)), equity-oriented risk factors (equity market (MKTRF), size spread factor 
(SMB)), and bond-oriented risk factors (bond market (YLDCHG), credit spread factor 
(BAAMTSY)). VIX (Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index) data are 
obtained from CBOE website. 
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Panel B. Derivaties Users and Non-Users. I use the average of the “Derivatives” indicator 
across funds for each manager. The indicator is from the TASS snapshot as of April 25, 
2012. I split the sample into two sub-samples because more than half are non-users (173 
managers are classified as users and 468 as non-users). I form an equally weighed 
portfolio of going long the derivative users and short the non-users. Then I estimate the 
individual funds’ alphas by solving equations (6d) to (6f) subject to (6a) to (6c) and (6g) 
using the GMM method with a Newey-West lag of three and full 12 months of 
observation. I apply prior quarter-end holdings information to the current quarter 
information. 
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Reported are the monthly alpha estimates of yearly performance, the corresponding standard errors and t-statistics. 
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Selectivity 
Estimate 0.0022 -0.0008 -0.0012 0.0011 0.0001 -0.0029 0.0019 0.0012 0.0010 -0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0006 0.0014 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 
StdErr 0.0020 0.0024 0.0011 0.0013 0.0009 0.0019 0.0024 0.0013 0.0012 0.0014 0.0008 0.0006 0.0008 0.0013 0.0014 0.0006 
t-value 1.06 -0.34 -1.14 0.86 0.14 -1.54 0.81 0.95 0.82 -0.27 -1.26 -1.03 1.77 -0.19 0.03 -0.09 
Timing 
Estimate -0.0021 0.0006 0.0020 -0.0012 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0011 0.0013 -0.0028 -0.0016 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0001 
StdErr 0.0009 0.0014 0.0010 0.0017 0.0005 0.0027 0.0010 0.0008 0.0010 0.0013 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 
t-value -2.28 0.45 1.98 -0.69 -0.63 -0.28 -1.02 1.70 -2.76 -1.30 -0.45 -0.47 -0.61 1.39 -2.23 0.32 
Total 
Estimate 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0036 0.0008 0.0025 -0.0018 -0.0020 -0.0012 -0.0007 0.0013 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0001 
StdErr 0.0022 0.0014 0.0008 0.0012 0.0008 0.0032 0.0022 0.0012 0.0013 0.0013 0.0009 0.0006 0.0009 0.0013 0.0013 0.0009 
t-value 0.05 -0.16 1.03 -0.08 -0.23 -1.11 0.38 2.01 -1.37 -1.58 -1.26 -1.13 1.53 0.04 -0.30 0.10 
Liquidity 
Estimate -0.0003 0.0008 0.0008 -0.0005 0.0002 0.0007 -0.0014 0.0004 -0.0018 -0.0009 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 
StdErr 0.0004 0.0014 0.0009 0.0006 0.0003 0.0023 0.0010 0.0007 0.0006 0.0005 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 
t-value -0.79 0.52 0.98 -0.92 0.72 0.31 -1.41 0.52 -3.05 -2.08 -1.66 -0.61 -0.79 1.89 -1.13 -1.39 
Market 
Estimate -0.0016 -0.0002 0.0015 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0006 0.0003 0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0005 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0003 
StdErr 0.0008 0.0002 0.0009 0.0011 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0008 0.0008 0.0004 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 
t-value -2.05 -0.71 1.70 -0.29 -1.75 -1.54 0.75 1.88 -1.38 -0.59 0.60 0.87 0.02 0.08 -0.13 0.74 
Volatility 
Estimate -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0009 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
StdErr 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0001 0.0010 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
t-value -1.23 0.05 -2.08 -1.00 -0.15 -0.87 0.47 -0.10 0.63 -3.44 -5.73 -1.83 1.21 -0.28 -0.43 1.12 
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Figure 6. Distribution of individual fund alphas. 
 
Histograms of monthly individual funds’ alphas are depicted for each ability. Normal and 
kernel distributions are fitted. I estimate the individual funds’ alphas by solving equations 
(6d) to (6f) subject to (6a) to (6c) and (6g) using the GMM method with a Newey-West 
lag of three. I apply prior quarter-end holdings information to the current quarter 
information. I require each fund to have at least 15 observations over the sample period 
January 1995 to December 2010.  
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Table 8. Bootstrap Analysis.  
 
I generate 1,000 hypothetical cross-sections of individual funds’ alphas and the corresponding t-statistics under the assumption of no 
ability by randomly sampling with replacement monthly market returns, market liquidity risk, and stock idiosyncratic returns, with 
portfolio holdings, stocks’ market-, and liquidity betas fixed. For each cross-section, I rank hypothetical alphas and the t-statistics, and 
then compare them to the corresponding actual ranked estimate and t-statistics. Reported are actual estimate, its t-statistic, and the 
empirical p-value for each ability and selected percentile. The empirical p-value for skill (luck) is computed by 
defgh,i 
∑ /iklmnopqorstu,   rviwsoxtu2r
,yyy
, or defgh, 
∑ /z{eklmnopqorstu,   rvz{ewsoxtu2r
,yyy
 (one less the empirical p-values for skill). 
 
 
 
 Min 1st 5th 10th 25th Med 75th 90th 95th 99th Max 
Selectivity 
Actual Estimate -0.021 -0.016 -0.007 -0.004 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.011 0.017 0.045 
p-value_skill 0.001 0.063 0.273 0.461 0.907 0.983 0.942 0.989 0.995 1.000 0.944 
p-value_luck 0.999 0.937 0.727 0.539 0.093 0.017 0.058 0.011 0.005 0.000 0.056 
Timing 
Actual Estimate -0.043 -0.030 -0.018 -0.012 -0.007 -0.003 -0.001 0.004 0.009 0.017 0.022 
p-value_skill 0.192 0.444 0.606 0.600 0.703 0.829 0.929 0.570 0.481 0.685 0.928 
p-value_luck 0.808 0.556 0.394 0.400 0.297 0.171 0.071 0.430 0.519 0.315 0.072 
Total 
Actual Estimate -0.061 -0.036 -0.018 -0.012 -0.006 -0.001 0.003 0.007 0.012 0.026 0.041 
p-value_skill 0.253 0.390 0.515 0.597 0.796 0.933 0.956 0.988 0.985 0.953 0.984 
p-value_luck 0.747 0.610 0.485 0.403 0.204 0.067 0.044 0.012 0.015 0.047 0.016 
Liquidity 
Actual Estimate -0.011 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.007 
p-value_skill 0.200 0.181 0.407 0.471 0.553 0.651 0.768 0.924 0.956 0.964 0.971 
p-value_luck 0.800 0.819 0.593 0.529 0.447 0.349 0.232 0.076 0.044 0.036 0.029 
Market 
Actual Estimate -0.040 -0.026 -0.014 -0.008 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 0.004 0.010 0.020 0.027 
p-value_skill 0.264 0.434 0.566 0.501 0.541 0.713 0.875 0.618 0.457 0.573 0.754 
p-value_luck 0.736 0.566 0.434 0.499 0.459 0.287 0.125 0.382 0.543 0.427 0.246 
Volatility 
Actual Estimate -0.010 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.009 
p-value_skill 0.399 0.494 0.649 0.732 0.885 0.871 0.787 0.655 0.494 0.545 0.532 
p-value_luck 0.601 0.506 0.351 0.268 0.115 0.129 0.213 0.345 0.506 0.455 0.468 
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  Min 1st 5th 10th 25th Med 75th 90th 95th 99th Max 
Selectivity 
Actual t-statistic -3.01 -2.20 -1.26 -0.81 -0.09 0.82 1.71 2.43 2.91 3.79 6.63 
p-value_skill 0.511 0.920 0.929 0.914 0.952 0.883 0.749 0.790 0.765 0.766 0.065 
p-value_luck 0.489 0.080 0.071 0.086 0.048 0.117 0.251 0.210 0.235 0.234 0.935 
Timing 
Actual t-statistic -3.30 -2.14 -1.33 -1.03 -0.73 -0.48 -0.13 0.59 1.21 2.26 2.86 
p-value_skill 0.357 0.253 0.170 0.229 0.465 0.702 0.873 0.811 0.774 0.879 0.985 
p-value_luck 0.643 0.747 0.830 0.771 0.535 0.298 0.127 0.189 0.226 0.121 0.015 
Total 
Actual t-statistic -4.81 -2.16 -1.32 -0.89 -0.54 -0.11 0.40 1.07 1.55 2.67 4.01 
p-value_skill 0.891 0.440 0.418 0.380 0.713 0.929 0.993 0.990 0.956 0.816 0.803 
p-value_luck 0.109 0.560 0.582 0.620 0.287 0.071 0.007 0.010 0.044 0.184 0.197 
Liquidity 
Actual t-statistic -3.04 -2.66 -1.95 -1.66 -1.07 -0.60 -0.03 0.71 1.15 2.01 2.74 
p-value_skill 0.055 0.192 0.239 0.309 0.352 0.575 0.772 0.864 0.892 0.927 0.962 
p-value_luck 0.945 0.808 0.761 0.691 0.648 0.425 0.228 0.136 0.108 0.073 0.038 
Market 
Actual t-statistic -2.94 -2.18 -1.38 -1.05 -0.61 -0.31 -0.05 0.53 1.21 1.98 2.97 
p-value_skill 0.173 0.210 0.190 0.274 0.467 0.615 0.837 0.833 0.684 0.871 0.921 
p-value_luck 0.827 0.790 0.810 0.726 0.533 0.385 0.163 0.167 0.316 0.129 0.079 
Volatility 
Actual t-statistic -2.88 -2.70 -2.50 -2.29 -1.57 -0.55 0.09 0.91 3.18 13.79 26.66 
p-value_skill 0.091 0.364 0.711 0.874 0.970 0.887 0.854 0.958 0.465 0.096 0.069 
p-value_luck 0.909 0.636 0.289 0.126 0.030 0.113 0.146 0.042 0.535 0.904 0.931 
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Table 9. Performance Persistence. 
 
For each year, individual funds are sorted into quintiles according to the prior year’s 
performance or the entire performance history. Then the quintile portfolios, and the 
spread portfolio of going long for the top quintile portfolio and short for the bottom are 
formed using equal weight. I report the alphas for the portfolios rebalanced each year 
according to the prior performance and held for one year, and the corresponding t-statistic 
estimated using the GMM method with a Newey-West of lag three. 
Panel A. Ranking of individual funds based on the prior year’s performance requiring a 
full 12 months of observations for the prior year. To ensure that I have enough funds for 
ranking, I begin the evaluation period in 1997. 
 
Ranked on prior year's total alpha 
Parameter 
1 (Best) 2 3 4 5 (Worst) 1-5 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value p.a. t-value 
 -0.0011 -0.32 -0.0014 -0.38 -0.0011 -0.32 -0.0013 -0.35 -0.0007 -0.16 -0.52% -0.40 
 -0.0007 -0.65 -0.0005 -0.91 -0.0004 -1.08 -0.0007 -1.30 -0.0003 -0.55 -0.42% -0.36 
 0.0001 0.08 -0.0002 -0.18 -0.0004 -0.47 -0.0003 -0.43 -0.0005 -0.58 0.69% 1.15 
 0.0042 3.46 0.0028 3.00 0.0024 3.11 0.0011 1.23 0.0012 0.91 3.69% 2.20 
alpha_timing -0.0017 -0.38 -0.0020 -0.47 -0.0019 -0.47 -0.0023 -0.56 -0.0015 -0.32 -0.25% -0.13 
alpha_total 0.0025 0.53 0.0008 0.18 0.0005 0.13 -0.0011 -0.28 -0.0003 -0.07 3.44% 1.48 
 
Ranked on prior year's selectivity alpha 
Parameter 
1 (Best) 2 3 4 5 (Worst) 1-5 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value p.a. t-value 
 -0.0012 -0.32 -0.0011 -0.31 -0.0012 -0.33 -0.0010 -0.27 -0.0012 -0.31 0.06% 0.08 
 -0.0008 -0.76 -0.0005 -0.98 -0.0007 -1.47 -0.0003 -0.78 -0.0003 -0.61 -0.57% -0.55 
 -0.0002 -0.24 -0.0003 -0.34 -0.0003 -0.33 -0.0004 -0.44 -0.0002 -0.18 -0.07% -0.18 
 0.0043 3.26 0.0027 2.62 0.0016 2.07 0.0020 2.54 0.0011 0.86 3.92% 2.11 
alpha_timing -0.0022 -0.48 -0.0019 -0.45 -0.0021 -0.52 -0.0016 -0.39 -0.0017 -0.38 -0.58% -0.42 
alpha_total 0.0022 0.44 0.0008 0.18 -0.0004 -0.11 0.0004 0.09 -0.0006 -0.14 3.34% 1.43 
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Ranked on prior year's total timing alpha 
Parameter 
1 (Best) 2 3 4 5 (Worst) 1-5 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value p.a. t-value 
 -0.0017 -0.47 -0.0010 -0.28 -0.0011 -0.30 -0.0011 -0.29 -0.0009 -0.23 -0.95% -0.60 
 -0.0007 -0.70 -0.0003 -0.50 -0.0005 -1.34 -0.0007 -1.11 -0.0005 -0.66 -0.18% -0.15 
7 0.0006 0.56 -0.0002 -0.19 -0.0004 -0.44 -0.0006 -0.68 -0.0007 -0.92 1.55% 2.24 
8 0.0031 2.54 0.0021 2.36 0.0027 3.18 0.0020 2.46 0.0020 1.49 1.42% 0.80 
alpha_timing -0.0018 -0.40 -0.0014 -0.34 -0.0020 -0.48 -0.0023 -0.53 -0.0021 -0.47 0.42% 0.18 
alpha_total 0.0014 0.32 0.0006 0.15 0.0007 0.17 -0.0003 -0.07 -0.0001 -0.03 1.84% 0.83 
 
Ranked on prior year's market timing alpha 
Parameter 
1 (Best) 2 3 4 5 (Worst) 1-5 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value p.a. t-value 
 -0.0006 -0.19 -0.0012 -0.33 -0.0012 -0.32 -0.0012 -0.32 -0.0014 -0.35 0.98% 0.47 
 -0.0006 -0.80 -0.0003 -0.64 -0.0007 -1.60 -0.0006 -1.13 -0.0005 -0.76 -0.18% -0.42 
7 0.0003 0.36 -0.0002 -0.26 -0.0004 -0.49 -0.0004 -0.47 -0.0006 -0.65 1.06% 2.52 
8 0.0032 2.70 0.0033 3.51 0.0013 1.85 0.0024 2.65 0.0015 1.15 2.04% 1.32 
alpha_timing -0.0009 -0.23 -0.0017 -0.41 -0.0023 -0.54 -0.0021 -0.50 -0.0025 -0.50 1.85% 0.80 
alpha_total 0.0023 0.54 0.0016 0.39 -0.0010 -0.23 0.0003 0.07 -0.0010 -0.20 3.89% 1.81 
 
Ranked on prior year's volatility alpha 
Parameter 
1 (Best) 2 3 4 5 (Worst) 1-5 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value p.a. t-value 
 -0.0022 -0.60 -0.0014 -0.38 -0.0015 -0.41 -0.0008 -0.21 0.0002 0.04 -2.79% -1.50 
 -0.0005 -0.66 -0.0008 -1.49 -0.0005 -1.17 -0.0006 -1.02 -0.0002 -0.19 -0.43% -0.31 
7 -0.0001 -0.05 -0.0002 -0.24 -0.0004 -0.42 -0.0004 -0.43 -0.0003 -0.37 0.33% 0.46 
8 0.0020 1.76 0.0027 2.77 0.0023 2.80 0.0017 1.89 0.0031 2.20 -1.34% -0.69 
alpha_timing -0.0028 -0.62 -0.0024 -0.57 -0.0023 -0.55 -0.0017 -0.39 -0.0003 -0.08 -2.90% -1.15 
alpha_total -0.0007 -0.17 0.0003 0.07 0.0000 -0.01 0.0000 -0.01 0.0028 0.59 -4.24% -1.47 
 
Ranked on prior year's liquidity timing alpha 
Parameter 
1 (Best) 2 3 4 5 (Worst) 1-5 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value p.a. t-value 
 -0.0017 -0.46 -0.0012 -0.35 -0.0011 -0.31 -0.0008 -0.23 -0.0008 -0.20 -1.13% -1.28 
 -0.0007 -0.69 -0.0005 -0.89 -0.0003 -0.65 -0.0004 -0.77 -0.0007 -0.74 0.05% 0.03 
7 0.0001 0.14 0.0000 -0.03 -0.0003 -0.40 -0.0005 -0.58 -0.0006 -0.68 0.88% 1.18 
8 0.0015 1.23 0.0028 3.09 0.0031 3.45 0.0019 2.06 0.0025 1.88 -1.13% -0.57 
alpha_timing -0.0023 -0.50 -0.0018 -0.43 -0.0017 -0.42 -0.0017 -0.41 -0.0021 -0.45 -0.20% -0.09 
alpha_total -0.0007 -0.16 0.0010 0.25 0.0014 0.33 0.0003 0.06 0.0004 0.08 -1.34% -0.55 
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Panel B. Ranking of individual funds based on the entire performance history, requiring 
at least 15 monthly observations during the history. To ensure that I have enough funds 
for ranking, I start the evaluation period in 1998. 
 
Ranked on the total alpha from the entire history 
Parameter 
1 (Best) 2 3 4 5 (Worst) 1-5 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value p.a. t-value 
 -0.0020 -0.57 -0.0020 -0.54 -0.0021 -0.55 -0.0019 -0.49 -0.0022 -0.51 0.17% 0.17 
 -0.0004 -0.48 -0.0006 -1.15 -0.0004 -0.83 -0.0006 -1.02 -0.0004 -0.67 -0.06% -0.07 
7 0.0000 -0.03 -0.0003 -0.29 -0.0003 -0.36 -0.0003 -0.37 -0.0002 -0.23 0.24% 0.63 
8 0.0040 3.57 0.0030 3.47 0.0030 3.54 0.0026 2.19 0.0018 1.62 2.60% 1.72 
alpha_timing -0.0025 -0.56 -0.0029 -0.66 -0.0028 -0.63 -0.0028 -0.62 -0.0028 -0.56 0.35% 0.26 
alpha_total 0.0015 0.31 0.0001 0.02 0.0002 0.05 -0.0002 -0.04 -0.0009 -0.19 2.95% 1.55 
 
Ranked on the timing alpha from the entire history 
Parameter 
1 (Best) 2 3 4 5 (Worst) 1-5 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value p.a. t-value 
 -0.0026 -0.70 -0.0023 -0.60 -0.0015 -0.41 -0.0018 -0.47 -0.0021 -0.52 -0.04% -0.45 
 -0.0006 -1.10 -0.0003 -0.69 -0.0006 -1.19 -0.0006 -0.77 -0.0003 -0.38 -0.03% -0.60 
7 0.0000 -0.04 -0.0004 -0.41 -0.0003 -0.34 -0.0002 -0.23 -0.0003 -0.33 0.03% 1.22 
8 0.0035 3.64 0.0024 2.65 0.0025 2.68 0.0037 3.11 0.0025 2.14 0.10% 0.87 
alpha_timing -0.0032 -0.72 -0.0029 -0.66 -0.0024 -0.56 -0.0026 -0.57 -0.0027 -0.57 -0.04% -0.38 
alpha_total 0.0003 0.06 -0.0006 -0.12 0.0001 0.02 0.0011 0.23 -0.0003 -0.05 0.05% 0.38 
 
Ranked on the selectivity alpha from the entire history 
Parameter 
1 (Best) 2 3 4 5 (Worst) 1-5 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value p.a. t-value 
 -0.0017 -0.49 -0.0021 -0.55 -0.0019 -0.49 -0.0019 -0.47 -0.0025 -0.61 0.08% 1.00 
 -0.0006 -0.52 -0.0004 -0.73 -0.0006 -1.25 -0.0003 -0.71 -0.0007 -1.57 0.01% 0.16 
7 0.0000 -0.03 -0.0004 -0.50 -0.0003 -0.35 -0.0003 -0.34 -0.0001 -0.08 0.00% 0.11 
8 0.0036 2.83 0.0029 3.46 0.0025 2.60 0.0025 2.88 0.0026 2.08 0.11% 0.84 
alpha_timing -0.0023 -0.52 -0.0029 -0.65 -0.0028 -0.63 -0.0025 -0.55 -0.0032 -0.68 0.09% 0.90 
alpha_total 0.0013 0.27 -0.0001 -0.02 -0.0003 -0.06 0.0000 0.01 -0.0006 -0.13 0.20% 1.21 
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Ranked on the market timing alpha from the entire history 
Parameter 
1 (Best) 2 3 4 5 (Worst) 1-5 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value p.a. t-value 
 -0.0025 -0.66 -0.0020 -0.54 -0.0014 -0.38 -0.0021 -0.54 -0.0023 -0.56 -0.01% -0.15 
 -0.0009 -1.10 -0.0004 -0.67 -0.0005 -1.03 -0.0005 -0.84 -0.0001 -0.28 -0.08% -1.30 
7 -0.0002 -0.21 -0.0002 -0.23 -0.0004 -0.46 -0.0002 -0.17 -0.0003 -0.33 0.01% 0.54 
8 0.0033 2.91 0.0030 2.83 0.0029 3.40 0.0029 2.87 0.0023 2.34 0.10% 1.14 
alpha_timing -0.0035 -0.77 -0.0027 -0.59 -0.0023 -0.53 -0.0028 -0.61 -0.0028 -0.58 -0.08% -0.65 
alpha_total -0.0002 -0.05 0.0004 0.08 0.0006 0.14 0.0002 0.04 -0.0005 -0.10 0.03% 0.21 
 
Ranked on the volatility timing alpha from the entire history 
Parameter 
1 (Best) 2 3 4 5 (Worst) 1-5 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value p.a. t-value 
 -0.0025 -0.62 -0.0020 -0.52 -0.0023 -0.61 -0.0019 -0.50 -0.0014 -0.36 -0.11% -1.73 
 -0.0003 -0.32 -0.0005 -0.90 -0.0008 -1.37 -0.0001 -0.17 -0.0006 -0.88 0.03% 0.37 
7 -0.0002 -0.22 -0.0003 -0.38 -0.0002 -0.27 -0.0004 -0.46 -0.0001 -0.10 -0.01% -0.62 
8 0.0031 2.46 0.0027 2.92 0.0033 3.43 0.0030 2.95 0.0023 2.36 0.08% 0.73 
alpha_timing -0.0030 -0.61 -0.0028 -0.63 -0.0033 -0.75 -0.0023 -0.54 -0.0020 -0.46 -0.10% -1.01 
alpha_total 0.0001 0.03 -0.0001 -0.02 0.0000 0.00 0.0007 0.15 0.0003 0.07 -0.02% -0.15 
 
Ranked on the liquidity timing alpha from the entire history 
Parameter 
1 (Best) 2 3 4 5 (Worst) 1-5 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value p.a. t-value 
 -0.0021 -0.54 -0.0020 -0.53 -0.0020 -0.54 -0.0020 -0.54 -0.0020 -0.50 0.00% -0.08 
 -0.0002 -0.28 -0.0004 -0.82 -0.0006 -1.36 -0.0005 -0.73 -0.0008 -0.64 0.06% 0.54 
7 -0.0001 -0.13 -0.0003 -0.38 -0.0003 -0.39 -0.0003 -0.29 -0.0002 -0.17 0.01% 0.18 
8 0.0036 3.43 0.0022 2.46 0.0029 3.62 0.0024 2.74 0.0035 2.24 0.01% 0.10 
alpha_timing -0.0023 -0.51 -0.0027 -0.62 -0.0030 -0.68 -0.0028 -0.62 -0.0030 -0.59 0.06% 0.42 
alpha_total 0.0013 0.27 -0.0005 -0.11 -0.0001 -0.02 -0.0004 -0.08 0.0005 0.10 0.08% 0.45 
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Figure 7. Predictability of liquidity 
 
Panel A. Actual traded liquidity risk factor and one-month ahead forecast. For each 
month I run OLS regressions of traded liquidity risk factors on 29 (=512) possible 
combinations of the 9 publicly available information variables, using the prior 60 months 
of observations. My candidate variables include lagged traded liquidity risk factor, lagged 
book-to-market ratio (the ratio of book value to market value for the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average), lagged Treasury-bill rate (3-Month Treasury), lagged long-term 
yield (long-term government bond yield), lagged inflation rate (Consumer Price Index), 
lagged stock variance (sum of squared daily returns on the S&P 500), lagged CRSP 
spread value-weighted index, lagged dividend price ratio (the difference between the log 
of dividends and the log of prices), and lagged earnings price (the difference between the 
log of earnings and the log of prices). Among the 512 models, I choose the best 
regression model based on several model selection criteria such as AIC, BIC, and R2. 
Then I make the one-month ahead forecast using current month’s realized public 
information and the parameter estimates of the selected model.   
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Panel B. Pearson correlation coefficient of the actual traded liquidity risk factor and its 
one-month ahead forecast. For each month I use 60 monthly (current month and 59 prior 
months) observations to compute the recursive Pearson correlation coefficients between 
the actual traded liquidity risk factor and its one-month ahead forecast.    
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Panel C. Squared value of the correlation coefficient. 
For each month I use 60 monthly (current month and 59 prior months) observations to 
compute the squared Pearson correlation coefficient between the actual traded liquidity 
risk portfolio return and its one-month ahead forecast. 
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Panel D. Inclusion frequency of the variables in the best set under the AIC. For each 
variable, the table plots a dummy variable that equals one if the variable is included in the 
best model for the month, and zero otherwise. I report only the results based on AIC 
because the models chosen under the AIC and BIC give similar results, and the model 
selected under the adjusted R2 almost always include all the 9 variables.  
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